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Financing Corporate Elections

Andrew A. Schwartz*
Electionsfor corporate directorships have become more competitive and expensive
in recent years, raising important questions of corporate campaign finance, such as
whether an insurgent campaign must disclose the source of its funding and whether a
directoris permittedto receive third-partycompensation during her term in office (known
as a "golden leash"). These present novel and unanswered issues of corporate law, but
many analogous issues have been resolved in the political sphere using the First
Amendment and a well-developed line of Supreme Court case law beginningwith Buckley
v. Valeo and continuing through Citizens United and other key precedents. This body of
law, known as the 'Buckley framework," is premised in part on the need to defend a
republican form of government from incumbent officials who may seek to entrench
themselves in office by imposing tightfinancial constraints on campaigns that seek to
unseat them.
This Article contends that the underlying logic of the Buckley framework is
transferrableto the corporatecontext. Corporationsare organizedbased on a republican
form of governance akin to our politicaldemocracy where shareholdersvote for directors
who serve a fixed term. Just as in the political arena, there is a concern that incumbent
directors may seek to thwart corporate democracy and entrench themselves in office. For
this reason, the famous Blasius doctrine of corporate law calls for searching judicial
scrutiny when an incumbent boardinterferes with the ability ofshareholdersto vote them
out of office. This Article argues that the Blasius doctrineshould apply when an incumbent
board of directors imposes regulations on the financing of challengers' campaigns, and
that the doctrineshould in such cases incorporatethe teachings of the Buckleyframework.
Underthe combined Blasius-Buckleyframework developed herein, incumbent boards have
authority to regulate the financing of corporateelections so long as there is a compelling
corporateinterest at stake. Finally, to illustratethe Blasius-Buckleyframework, the Article
analyzes corporatebylaws that regulateorprohibitthe golden leash, concluding that while
the so-called "Wachtell Bylaw" may go too far, a modified version would likely pass
muster.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. For helpful comments on prior drafts, I
thank Fred Bloom, Richard Collins, Brandon Gold, C.J. Hoppel, Kathryn Judge, Mark Loewenstein, John Morley,
Jason Schloetzer, Allison Schwartz, Anna Spain and Holger Spamann, as well as those that participated in the
fifth annual Junior Business Law Conference at the University of Colorado and a law faculty workshop also at
the University of Colorado. This Article is dedicated to my colleague, mentor, and friend, Mark Loewenstein.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The individuals who serve on the boards of directors of public companies wield
control over a staggering amount of property that they do not personally own. 1 Apple Inc.'s
cash holdings of $180 billion rivals the annual output of the State of Iowa, and its board of
directors is comprised of just seven people. 2 Bank of America has as many employees as
the State of New York, and it is controlled by a board of thirteen. 3 By what right do these
4
small groups of people get all this power?
The answer, in brief, is that they are democratically elected by the shareholders in a
system of corporate governance modeled on the "republican" form of government
practiced in the United States. 5 In the political arena, a republican form of government is
one based on the idea of "popular sovereignty," meaning the people are sovereign over the
government, not the other way around. 6 Government officials are elected by the people for
fixed terms and can be replaced at the end of their term if the people so choose. 7 By
analogy, the foundation of corporate governance is "shareholder sovereignty"-the idea
that the directors of a corporation are elected by the shareholders for fixed terms and can
be voted out if the shareholders so desire. 8 Like government officials, the fact that
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (a) (empowering the board of directors to manage the "business and
affairs of every corporation"). This Article is focused exclusively on publicly traded companies with large
numbers of shareholders, such as those that trade on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ, and generally
relies upon Delaware law. The present discussion is thus not directly relevant to director elections in companies
that are closely held by a small number of shareholders or are incorporated outside of Delaware.
2. Infra notes 39-40.
3. See BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2014), http://media.corporateir.net/mediafiles/IROLJ71/71595/AR2014.pdf (noting the company boasts "more than 220,000 employees");
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL (2014),
http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/14stall.xls (reporting that New York had 222,965 employees as of 2014).
4. See A.A. BERLE JR., ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 16 (1957) (stating "wherever there is
a question of power there is a question of legitimacy").
5.

See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION

104 (4th ed. 2012) (stating "the corporation has a republican form of government"); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure
Establishedby the Delaware General CorporationLaw, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 777 (2015) (explaining
that "Delaware employs in corporate law[] a republican model of corporate democracy"); Tom C.W. Lin, CEOs
and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351, 1358 (2014) ("Corporate democracy utilizes political democracy
as the governing principle for corporations."); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance
Question We Face: Can CorporationsBe Managedfor the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also
Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 3-4 (2010) (observing that corporate law has adopted a "republican
...model of corporate democracy"); Alan R. Palmiter, Public Corporationas private Constitution,6 ICFAI J.
CORP. & SEC. L. 8, 8 (2009) ("The large publicly-traded corporation in the United States derives its essential
structure ... from the republican form of government laid out in the US Constitution."); see also Blasius Indus.
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating "[tihe shareholder franchise is the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests").
6. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring that "Governments ...
deriv[e] their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed"); Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez From the Off.
of U.S. Sen. v. Wells, 7 A.3d 720, 763 (N.J. 2010) (stating "popular sovereignty" is the "fundamental notion"
that "all power resides with the people and that it is only by their consent that the people may be governed").
7. See U.S. CONST. art. TV,§ 4 (guaranteeing to each state a "republican form of government").
8. Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in ShareholderSovereignty, 41
CALIF. L. REV. 393, 393 (1953); see also id.
at 438 (suggesting that "contests for proxies are but an expression of
the shareholder's traditional and historic corporate sovereignty [akin to] Thomas Jefferson's political popular
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corporate directors are periodically elected by a sovereign electorate keeps them
accountable and renders their exercise of power legitimate, as opposed to tyrannical. 9
Putting rhetoric aside, however, experience shows incumbent directors have long been
re-elected to corporate boards without campaigning or even facing any opposition.
Director-elections are generally conducted through the mail-in form of "proxy voting,"
where the corporation solicits proxies from shareholders to re-elect the incumbent board
by mailing them a "proxy card" listing those candidates-and no others. Unsurprisingly,
the candidates comprising this "management slate" do not campaign at all, for the outcome
is preordained. In the 2015 election season, for instance, 98% of management-slate
directors won a majority of the shareholder vote, each receiving an average of 96% of the
votes cast. 10 Numbers like these have led countless commentators to dismiss proxy voting
as a charade and to question whether this type of "shareholder democracy" really does
confer legitimacy on the winners.I 1
But times are changing, as described in Part II below. As that Part will show, corporate
elections have started to become much more competitive in recent years as so-called
"activist" investors have launched lavish "proxy contests" to challenge the incumbent
directors. 12 Importantly, government policy favors such insurgent campaigns: the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has already enacted a "proxy access" rule and
is considering a "universal ballot" rule, both of which explicitly aim to help insurgent
shareholders defeat and displace incumbent directors. 13 Academic opinion is largely in
accord, with leading corporate scholars presenting ideas for enhancing the competitiveness
of corporate elections. 14 This convergence between corporate and political elections is a
nascent trend, but a trend nonetheless. As corporate elections have become more

sovereignty").
9. See ANDREW KEAY, BOARD AccOUNTABILITY INCORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19-30, 95-102, 209-14
(2015) ("Accountability... is a concept that is generally approved of by all right-minded people, whether it is in
relation to those who hold public office ... or directors of companies .... "). But cf., e.g., Elizabeth Pollman,
ConstitutionalizingCorporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssm.com/abstract-2661115
(explaining that "corporations are not democracies" as that concept is defined by political theorist Robert Dahl);
Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, CorporateVoting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 130 (2009) (recommending
that we "push any discussion of corporate voting away from a focus on democratic theory"); Usha Rodrigues,
The Seductive Comparison of Shareholderand Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397 (2006)
(stating that "corporations and political states are marked by differences so fundamental that it is dangerous to
extrapolate lessons from one realm to the other").
10. PROXYPULSE, 2015 PROXY SEASON WRAP-UP 5, at 2, http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Proxy
Pulse-Third-Edition-2015.pdf; see Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, JudicialSchizophrenia in Shareholder
Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 506 (1994) (reporting "[i]ncumbents' success in American public
corporations rivals that of former Soviet politicians").
11. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.1.1 at 95 (1986) (noting that a cynic might deride
shareholder voting as "a mere ceremony designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to managerial power").
12. Activist shareholders, who represent only a small sliver of the total shareholder population, sponsored
a majority of the proxy contests in the first half of 2014. Jason D. Schloetzer, Activist Hedge Funds, "Golden
Leash" Special CompensationArrangements, and Advance Notice Bylaws, THE CONF. BD. 1, 1-2 (Dec. 2015),
https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DNV7N5-Activist-Hedge-Fundsl.pdf&typ
e=subsite.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77 (discussing proxy access and the universal ballot). The SEC's
proxy access regulation was subsequently invalidated, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir.
2011), but its adoption indicates that the Commission looks favorably on the concept.
14. See, e.g., Bebchuk, infra note 26 (discussing how to reform corporate elections).
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competitive, director candidates have begun to operate corporate campaigns that bear many
similarities to campaigns for public office. 15
Most importantly for present purposes, the increased competition in corporate
elections has begun to raise important issues of campaign finance analogous to those
addressed in the political arena and analyzed in landmark First Amendment opinions by
the Supreme Court, especially the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo. 16 These cases-and
the statutes on which they are founded-have thoughtfully grappled with the government's
interest in limiting the corrupting power of money in politics, the incumbent's personal
interest in retaining power, and the vital importance of fair elections to a republican
democracy. The fundamental issues of campaign finance regulation are similar in both the
government and corporate context. In both cases, there is a concern that limits on campaign
finance imposed by the incumbents are self-serving in that they impede challengers and
thus perpetuate themselves in power. 17 On the other hand, there is also recognition that
there are legitimate interests to limit or regulate the financing of campaigns, such as the
prevention of corruption. All of this has been carefully analyzed in the public context under
the First Amendment.
Corporate law, by contrast, has never really addressed the issue of financing director
campaigns. The rules of corporate campaign finance have always been simple and few:
Incumbents can spend reasonable amounts of corporate funds on defending a proxy contest
18
while insurgents must finance their own campaigns (but may be reimbursed if they win).
Beyond that, there have never been any limits placed on how dissident campaigns are
financed, by whom, how much, etc. In recent years, this lack of legal limits on the financing
of director campaigns in American public companies has opened the door to practices that
would constitute serious crimes if they were to be employed in a campaign for public office.
Consider the important example of the "golden leash," an agreement whereby a
shareholder promises a director-candidate a substantial supplementary 19 compensation
during her term in office. 20 Such a thing would be unthinkable in a political election, not
to mention illegal. 2 1 As Section II.C explains, the golden leash represents all that is most
dangerous about campaign finance. Large payments directly from one party (or a group)

15. See Harris,ShareholderCampaign Funds, infra note 26, at 173 (discussing how corporate elections are
comparable to political elections).
16. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. See, e.g., id at 251 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing "grave risks in
legislation, enacted by incumbents. . . that tend to perpetuate those who control legislative power").
18. Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Co., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955).
19. Beyond the ordinary director fees that are paid by the company.
20. See generally infra Section I.C (describing the golden leash); Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate
Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 649 (2016). Golden leash payments are
generally comprised of performance-based compensation, see infra text accompanying notes 103-04, and are
sometimes paid even if the director-candidate loses the election and fails to win a seat on the board. See infra text
accompanying notes 133-34. They are third-party payments from a sponsoring shareholder to an outsider; thus a
payment from a sponsor to a candidate who is also an employee of the sponsor (e.g., a hedge fund manager who
receives compensation from the fund) is not considered a golden leash for present purposes.
21. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 18: 1469 (1992) ("Bribery of a candidate" is punishable by up to five years
in prison "with or without hard labor."); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
federal bribery statute covers payments made to candidates). But cf United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797,
799 (D.N.J. 2012) (construing state bribery statute to exclude payments made to unsuccessful candidate).
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to a director-candidate rouse the obvious suspicion that the candidate, should she be
elected, may be inclined to act favorably toward the donor and its interests, as opposed to
serving the long-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 22 Despite the
concern that directors may feel beholden to their sponsor, the golden leash has not only
been proposed as a theoretical matter-it has actually been put into practice at major public
companies. 2 3 While some criticize the golden leash as misguided, 24 even the critics
25
acknowledge that its defenders hold the upper hand.
The golden leash provides but one example of the broader field of corporate campaign
finance, a subject that has been left largely untouched by the legislator's command, the
judge's decree, and even the scholar's pen. 26 But this silence can no longer stand, for at
least two reasons. First, competitive corporate elections, once quite rare, are increasing in
both frequency and intensity. 27 Second, after Citizens United,28 which held a corporation

must be permitted, under the First Amendment, to spend as much as it wishes to speak on
political matters; 29 therefore, corporate elections have the potential to bear directly on
political ones.
The financing of corporate elections raises important and difficult questions of law
and policy, including: (1) May a candidate raise unlimited outside funds to finance her
campaign, or should there be limits, either per-donor or in the aggregate? (2) May anyone
contribute to a director-candidate's campaign fund, or should this be limited to
shareholders or even a subset thereof, such as long-term shareholders? (3) Should directorcandidates have to disclose the source of their funding? (4) May a successful candidate
receive side payments during her term in office, as with a golden leash?
These are all new questions for corporate elections, and there is no case law on point.
In the public sphere, however, analogous questions have been answered using the First
Amendment and the so-called "Buckley framework" derived from Buckley v. Valeo. Under
this body of Supreme Court case law, described in detail in Part III below, political

22. See infra text accompanying note 319 (explaining that corporate law requires directors to maximize the
pecuniary value of the corporation over the long term for the benefit of the shareholders).
23. See infra Section II.C (discussing golden leashes in proxy contests); Cain et al., supra note 20, at 65354.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 141-48 (discussing critiques of the golden leash).
25. See Martin Lipton, ISS Publishes Guidance on Director Compensation (and Other Qualification)
Bylaws, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 16,
2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/16/iss-publishes-guidance-on-director-compensation-and-otherqualification-bylaws/ ("In light of ISS' threat that it may issue withhold vote recommendations against boards
that adopt director compensation bylaws, it can be expected that many companies will decide that discretion is
the better part of valor and avoid a confrontation with ISS, despite the risks posed by 'golden leash' schemes.").
26. The very few scholars that have addressed the subject narrowly focus their discussions on ways to
encourage or require corporations to finance insurgent campaigns in a manner akin to public financing for political
candidates. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise,93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007)
(discussing how the financing of insurgent campaigns should be done in a similar way to that of the financing for
political candidates); Lee Harris, The Politics ofShareholder Voting, 86 NYU L. REV. 1761 (2011); Lee Harris,
Shareholder Campaign Funds: A Campaign Subsidy Scheme For CorporateElections, 58 UCLA L. REV. 167
(2010) [hereinafter Harris, ShareholderCampaign Funds].
27. Infra Section H.A.
28. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311 (2010).
29. This freedom pertains only to "independent" corporate expenditures, as opposed to those coordinated
with a campaign or candidate. See infra Section lll.C.2.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 41:4

campaign finance regulations are "subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government
to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest."'30 This is a demanding test that has led courts to strike down many
campaign finance laws-including contribution limits, expenditure limits, mandatory
disclosure and public financing-over the years.
Because corporations are modeled on the republican form of government, with
ultimate sovereignty lying with the shareholders, corporate law has a similar rule, or so I
shall claim in Part IV. The Blasius doctrine, named after the "famous" 3 1 Delaware case of
Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., provides that when a corporate board acts "for the
primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power... the board bears
32
The
the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action."
Blasius doctrine is examined in detail in Section IV.A below.
I argue in Section IV.B that Blasius establishes a useful doctrinal framework for
33
campaign finance that is analogous to Buckley and adapted to the corporate context.
Under the Buckley framework, the incumbent government must show its campaign finance
34
regulation furthers a "compelling interest" and is "narrowly tailored" to achieve it.
Similarly, under Blasius, the incumbent board likewise must show a "compelling
justification" for its campaign finance regulation as well as a "reasonable fit" between
means and ends. 35 Based on the link between Blasius and Buckley, I establish what I call
the "Blasius-Buckley framework" for analyzing corporate campaign finance regulations
imposed by an incumbent board of directors.
Sections IV.C-D describe the Blasius-Buckley framework in detail. Section IV.C
examines which, if any, corporate interests qualify as a "compelling justification" for the
regulation of corporate campaign finance. In the political context, the Supreme Court has
accepted two government interests as sufficiently important to qualify as "compelling": (1)
36
the avoidance of corruption, and (2) the prevention of outside (i.e., foreign) interference.
I claim in that Section that both of these concerns have direct analogs that should be
recognized in the corporate sphere. I also argue that one interest that has not been found to
be compelling in the political context-but may be in the corporate one-is the idea that
expensive elections consume directors' time that could be better spent managing the
company. Section IV.D then examines the various methods of campaign finance regulation
used in the public sphere-contribution limits, expenditure limits, disclosure and collective
financing-to see which may prove useful in the corporate sphere, concluding that all may
play a role, depending on the compelling corporate interest at stake.
Finally, Part V applies the Blasius-Buckley framework to the concrete example of the
30. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
31. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Story of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.: Keeping the Electoral Path to
Takeovers Clear,in CORPORATE LAW STORIEs 243, 271 (Mark J. Ramseyer ed., 2009).
32. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (emphases supplied). Although
Blasius was a lower court opinion, the Supreme Court of Delaware has adopted its principles. Stroud v. Grace,
tenets of... Blasius.").
606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992) ("[W]e accept the basic legal
33. The current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court made brief, oblique references to this concept
during his tenure as a lower-court judge. See infra text accompanying notes 309-10 (discussing Chief Justice
Strine's lower court decisions).
34. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,140 (1976).
35. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661; Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 811, 819 (Del. Ch. 2007).
36. See infra Section 11I.B (discussing governmental interests under the Buckley framework).
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golden leash. As will appear, I conclude that corporate boards have ample (but not
unlimited) power to restrict golden leash payments in a variety of ways because it poses a
significant threat to the corporation. Thus, while the most prominent method of golden
leash regulation to date-the "Wachtell Bylaw"-may fail the test, a more-tailored version
would likely pass muster.
II. CORPORATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE EXAMPLE OF THE GOLDEN LEASH

Proxy contests have heated up in recent years, as activist shareholders increasingly
target even the largest and most well-established public companies. As these corporate
elections have become more competitive, they have begun to resemble political elections,
including their high cost. This, in turn, raises important issues relating to campaign
finance-just who is paying for those phone banks and attack ads, and what might they
want in return? This Part proceeds as follows: Section II.A describes the contemporary
world of contested corporate elections and then Section 1I.B examines the financing of such
campaigns. Finally, Section II.C focuses on a new and controversial method of financing
corporate elections, the golden leash, which is also the subject of Part V.
A. From Coronations to Contested CorporateElections
Republican democracy is the foundation of both political and corporate governance:
just as the people elect representatives to manage the government, so too the shareholders
elect corporate directors to manage the corporation. 3 7 This democratic process is vitally
important, because it provides the legitimacy for granting a small group of peoplewhether government officials or corporate directors-power over "vast aggregations of
property that they do not own.' '38 The issue of legitimacy is exacerbated in the corporate
context, where companies can be as large, in financial terms, as entire states and yet be
managed by a board of directors only a fraction of the size of a state legislature. Apple's
39
current cash pile alone is much larger than the state of Iowa's annual economic output,
and yet its board of directors consists of only eight people, compared with the 150-person
Iowa General Assembly. 40 Thus, one might expect shareholder elections for corporate
directors to be even more contentious than political elections, but this is not the case.
Corporate elections at public companies 41 have traditionally been staid, predictable
affairs with no campaigning to speak of.42 They look very different than political elections,
37. Supra note 5.
38. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (stating the "shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests"); see also KEAY, supra note 9, at 95-102 (explaining the
legitimating function of democratic accountability).
39. See Katie Benner, Apple Profit Is Up 31% as iPhones Sell Briskly, but Its ForecastIs Muted, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2015, at B3 (reporting on statement from Apple CFO that the company held $206 billion in cash);
Broad Growth Across States in 2014, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS tbl.1 (June
10, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdpstate/2015/pdf/gsp06l5.pdf (stating Iowa's
gross state product was approximately $152 billion in 2014).
40. Apple Press Info: Board of Directors, APPLE, http://www.apple.comlpr/bios/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2016); Legislators, THE IOWA LEGISLATURE, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislators (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
41. This Article is addressed solely to publicly traded companies. Supra note 1.
42. See, e.g., Paul. H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, The Theory and Practiceof Voting at U.S. Public
Companies, in JENNIFER G. HILL AND RANDALL S. THOMAS, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER
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which tend to be hard-fought and competitive in the United States, 4 3 with candidates and
their backers running elaborate (and expensive) campaigns. 44 Rather, in a corporate
election, the company mails each shareholder a proxy card listing a single slate of directors
nominated by the incumbent board (generally the incumbents themselves). On occasion,
an "insurgent" or "dissident" shareholder might send its own proxy card to the shareholders
listing an alternative slate of directors, but proxy contests such as these have been quite
rare. The overall effect, as Berle and Means famously observed almost a century ago, is
45
that the incumbent board effectively perpetuates itself in office.
This description, however true it once may have been, is now outdated. 46 A century
ago, stockholders were dispersed investors, each only holding such a small stake to make
them rationally apathetic about voting their proxy in a thoughtful way. 4 7 Over the decades,
however, there has been a substantial and increasing shift away from small, dispersed share
ownership to a substantial concentration among so-called "institutional" investors,
including pension funds, endowments, hedge funds, and other vehicles that collectively
48
manage trillions of dollars.
If you own only 0.00018% of J.C. Penney, 49 it makes good sense to just let
management perpetuate itself rather than try to figure out who could run the company
50
better. If you are unhappy with the investment, you can simply sell your shares and exit.
But if you own an 18% block, 5 1 it would surely be worthwhile to invest the time and energy
459, 469 (2015) ("For many years ... shareholder voting was largely a formality.").
43. See, e.g., Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,73 (2000) (recounting that, after about
six million Floridians voted in the 2000 presidential election, the contenders were fewer than 1,800 votes apart);
Anne Gearan & John Wagner, A Dead-Even Clinton, Sanders are Poisedfor a Long Slog, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
2016, at Al (reporting that the presidential primary race between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders for the
Democratic nomination for President was "effectively dead even").
44. See, e.g., James A. Thurber, Understanding the Dynamics and the Transformation of American
Government, in CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 9, 11 (James A. Thurber & Candice J. Nelson
eds., 4th ed. 2014) ("'Money is the mother's milk of politics,' as the late speaker of the California Assembly,
Jesse Unruh, said in the mid-1960s. Money has become even more important in twenty-first-century politics, as
shown by the precedent-setting six-billion-dollar 2012 election cycle."); id. at 9 (stating that "campaigns have
evolved into complex organizations featuring distinct divisions of labor and elaborate teams of (usually) outside
professionals who coordinate with party organizations"); State and Local Elections, in L. SANDY MAISEL &
MARK D. BREWER, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS INAMERICA: THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 195, 210 (6th ed. 2012)
(reporting that "[c]ampaigns for statewide office routinely require budgets in the millions of dollars and require
professional management").
45. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 5 (1932) (explaining that the board of directors of a corporation with dispersed shareholders
"can employ the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body"); Edelman & Thomas, supra note 42, at
462.
46. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism: Activist Investors and
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864 (2013).
47. See CLARK, supra note 11, § 9.5.1 at 390-92 (describing the rational apathy of dispersed shareholders).
48. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 46, at 875 ("Put graphically but not metaphorically, representatives
of institutions that collectively represent effective control of many large U.S. corporations could fit around a
boardroom table."); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445,447 (1991) ("Over the last forty years, institutional ownership of stock has rapidly
increased.").
49. Worth a few thousand dollars at current levels.
50. This is colloquially known as the "Wall Street Rule."
51. Worth hundreds of millions of dollars at current levels.
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52
into monitoring management and even providing them with your business ideas. Thus
was born the "activist" investor, defined as one who acquires "a significant but nonstrategy
controlling stake in a corporation and then tr[ies] to alter the company's business
53

initially through persuasion but sometimes through a follow-on proxy contest."

As of the turn of the millennium, there were just a few, relatively small activist hedge

funds, but their number and strength have grown by leaps and bounds in the years since.
Assets under management by activist hedge funds were estimated to be about $200 billion
in 2014.54 This is not only a huge absolute figure, but also one that has grown by 269%
we are now living in the "heyday
since 2009, and more than 4000% since 2001.55 In short,
56
of institutional investor activism in proxy contests."
This upsurge in the number of activist investors and in their financial firepower has
57
as well as in their
led to a significant increase in the number of proxy contests,
58
Back in the 1960s and '70s, the average number of proxy contests for
competitiveness.
59
This grew to about 15 per year during the early
control each year was about five or six.

1980s and 30 per year in the late 1980s, with the level of insurgent success increasing all
the while. 60 And while the 1990s saw something of a dip in the frequency of proxy contests
' 62
61
has brought them
the present "age of the activist investor
to about a dozen per year,
63
The early 2010s have witnessed about 25 proxy contests for control per
roaring back.
year, as well as about 65 proxy contests featuring "short slates" (where the dissident runs

64
for just for a minority of the board seats), with a very respectable combined success rate
of 33%.65 These numbers seem set only to increase, if for no other reason than the recent

52. See Miriam Gottfried, The Penney Dropsfor Ron Johnson, WALL STREET J., Aug. 11, 2012, at B16
(reporting that Pershing Square Capital Management, led by activist investor William Ackman, held an 18% stake
in J.C. Penney and supported a new business strategy).
53. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 46, at 867.
54. Michael D. Goldhaber, Marty Lipton's War on Hedge FundActivists, AM. LAW., Mar. 2015, at 44, 46.
55. Id.
56. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholder Activism and Ethics: Are ShareholderBonuses Incentives or Bribes?,
COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 29, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/04/29/shareholderactivism-and-ethics-are-shareholder-bonuses-incentives-or-bribes/.
57. Admittedly from a very low base.
58. See generally Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80, 87 (D. Conn. 1964) ("A proxy contest
has become a part of the corporate way of life.").
59. Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note 10, at 512-13.
60. Id.
61. Bebchuk, supranote 26, at 677.
62. See Goldhaber, supranote 54, at 44, 46 ("It has become a common meme that we live in the 'age of the
activist investor."').
63. See ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS § 10.01 (7th ed. 2015) (presenting empirical data suggesting that "[c]orporate America has
witnessed an increase in the number of proxy contests and consent solicitations in recent years").
64. R. FRANKLIN BALOTrI ET AL., MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS § 13.5 (2015) ("[W]e have witnessed in
recent years a boom in the threatened or actual 'short slate' or minority board fights.").
65. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 63, § 10.01 (35% figure calculated using numbers from the years
2009-13, the most-recent data presented); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental CorporateGovernance
Question We Face: Can CorporationsBe Managedfor the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also
Act and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. LAW. 1, 23 (2010) (stating "the election process is more vibrant than ever");
Andrew Ackerman & David Benoit, SEC Chief Tilts Again to Activists, WALL STREET J., June 25, 2015, at Cl
("Activists have been on a winning streak lately, securing at least some of what they sought in 73% of all corporate
elections last year, according to researcher FactSet.").
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growth in the number of activists and the amount of money under their control.
As impressive as these statistics sound, they omit a key portion of the contemporary
story, namely settlement of a threatened proxy contest by granting the activist shareholder
a board seat or two in exchange for the activist promising not to run a proxy contest.66
Rather than engaging in a full-on, drag-out proxy contest, companies and incumbent boards
that nip them in the bud can avoid costly and distracting proxy fights while still giving the
activist a voice in the boardroom.67 For this reason, settlements resulting in an insurgent
being granted one or more seats on the board are much more common than actual contested
elections. Over the past decade, "activists have been awarded board seats at 218 companies
[but only] 28 came via proxy fights," meaning that boards have collectively given up 190
seats "without having officially lost them." 68 This trend seems to be on the rise, as the
number of board seats granted to activist shareholders through settlement of a threatened
69
proxy contest has exploded in recent years, with 2015 representing the all-time high.
As if this were not enough, legal and regulatory changes are afoot to encourage even
more contested corporate elections in the future. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 expressly
empowered the SEC to require companies include shareholders' nominees directly on the
70
The SEC exercised this authority
company proxy; an idea known as "proxy access."

shortly thereafter, enacting a proxy access rule in 2010 that would have required public
companies to include on the company proxy the director-nominees of significant and longterm shareholders (individuals or groups holding at least 3% of the stock for more than

three years) for up to one-quarter of the board seats. 7 1 Although that particular rule was
72
shareholder pressure has led many leading
struck down on administrative grounds,
74
73
companies, including Microsoft and General Electric, to voluntarily adopt proxy access

in a form similar, if not equivalent, to that proposed by the SEC (i.e., 3% for three years
75
and only for a small minority of the seats).
66. Lee Harris, CorporateElections and Tactical Settlements, 39 J. CORP. L. 221, 224 (2014).
67. See David Benoit, Companies, Activists Declare Truce in Boardroom Battles, WALL STREET J., Dec.
10, 2013, at Al ("Activist investors are increasingly encountering an unusual reception when approaching
corporate targets: an open door. Instead of pulling up the drawbridge as activists approach, corporate executives
and directors more often are engaging, concluding that it is easier and cheaper to negotiate rather than resist and
risk a public fight .... ).
68. Dennis K. Berman, In Era ofActivists, Look to Changes, WALL STREET J., July 8, 2008, at Cl.
69. See Michelle Jones, Settlements with Activists Hit a New Record, VALUEWALK (June 9, 2015),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/06/settlements-activists/ (citing a report from FactSet).
70. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat.
1915 (2010).
71. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 9136, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,677-93 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249); see generally Jill E. Fisch, The
Destructive Ambiguity of FederalProxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435 (2012) (discussing problems associated with
the federal proxy access rule).
72. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating the proxy access nile
as arbitrary and capricious, finding that the SEC had failed adequately to "apprise itself-and hence the public
and the Congress--of the economic consequences" of proxy access).
73. Shira Ovide & Joann S. Lublin, Microsoft Makes It EasierforShareholdersto Nominate Candidatesto
Board,WALL STREET J., Aug. 7, 2015, at B3.
74. Gen. Elec., Annual Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 6,2015).
75. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: The Unintended
Consequences of Proxy Access Elections, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com
/id=1202721606790/The-Unintended-Consequences-of-Proxy-Access-Elections?slretum=20160106193831
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Beyond proxy access, the SEC has recently indicated an interest in a so-called
"universal ballot," a new type of proxy voting that would "allow both sides to send out
universal ballots, listing all candidates from management and dissident slates, allowing
shareholders to split their vote." 76 The universal ballot is explicitly designed to make
director elections more competitive. 77 With all 78this political force behind competitive
corporate elections, this trend seems here to stay.
B. The Financingof CorporateElections

As discussed in the previous Section, major changes in the shareholder population and
the rise of the activist investor have made contemporary corporate elections much more

competitive than those in the bygone days of Berle and Means. And as they have become
more competitive, corporate campaigns have begun to closely resemble traditional political
80
campaigns for public office: 79 Director-candidates give speeches at fancy dinners and
81
publish full-page advertisements in the newspaper. Corporate campaigns mail letters,
82
fliers, and other materials to shareholder-voters, as well as solicit them on the phone.
They hire lawyers, consultants, and solicitors and launch sophisticated websites that feature

"political-style attack video[s].

' 83

("Proxy access is the darling of the 2015 season. Shareholder-sponsored proxy access proposals are on the ballots
of more than 100 U.S. public companies this spring," up from just twenty such proposals the year before.).
76. See Alexandra Higgins, SEC'S Stein Backs UniversalProxy Ballots, 2014 WL 1852985 (May 9, 2014)
(reporting that SEC Commissioner Kara Stein "called for mandatory universal proxy ballots that would allow all
shareholders to choose board candidates individually in proxy contests"); Ackerman & Benoit, supra note 65, at
Cl (describing SEC Chair Mary Jo White's interest in "what is known as a 'universal ballot,' a single voting form
in contested corporate elections").
77. See BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON'S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 85 (2015)
("Democracy is all about contestable elections.").
78. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78
CALIF. L. REv. 1073, 1082 (1990) (stating "proxy contests have reemerged as an important tool for acquiring
control").
79. See Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds, supra note 26, at 173 (observing that contested corporate
elections "have many similarities to political elections"). This is a long-term trend. See, e.g., CorporationsPowers of Stockholders-Stockholders Can Reimburse Victorious Insurgentsfrom CorporateTreasuryfor Proxy
Solicitation Expenses, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1132, 1134 (1956) (reporting that "rival groups [in corporate proxy
contests] have adopted many of the high-pressure tactics of a political campaign").
80. See e.g., Kristen Grind, Hess ChairmanCedes Title After 18 Years-Proxy Wars Put Money Managers
On the Hot Seat, WALL STREET J., May 11, 2013, at B1 (reporting that Hess Corp. hosted a meeting with a
"director nominee" for about twenty significant investors "at a dinner in New Orleans's French Quarter").
81. See, e.g., Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Vote for Control of Heinz Keeps Pittsburgh on Edge, N.Y.
TtMEs, Aug. 15, 2006, at Al (reporting on proxy contest at Heinz featuring "full-page advertisements in local and
national newspapers").
82. See Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds, supra note 26, at 173 ("Campaign material is mailed to
potential voter-shareholders, contestants set up phone-banking operations, pricey voting consultants are hired,
and so forth."); see, e.g., Jacob Bunge, DuPont'sSwing Voter: The Small Investor, WALL STREET J., May 7,2015,
at B I (reporting on proxy contest between DuPont Co. and Trian Fund Management LP in which shareholders
were "inundated with pitches from both sides").
83. David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin, Dow Chemical,Activist Strike a Deal, WALL STREET J., Nov. 22,
2014, at B3; see also, e.g., Jacob Bunge, DuPont'sSwing Voter: The Small Investor, WALL STREET J., May 7,
2015, at B I (reporting that a "Google search for 'DuPont Trian' brings up jousting websites created for the proxy
contest: dupontdelivers.com belongs to management, and dupontcanbegreat.com is Trian's").
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Campaigns like these cost money-a lot of money. 84 Even as far back as the 1950s,
a proxy campaign could cost tens of thousands of dollars on each side, or even $100,000
or more in a heated contest. 85 By the turn of the 21 st century, proxy contests routinely cost
86
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and million-dollar expenses were not unheard of.
87
Today, in the heyday of the activist investor, a full-on proxy contest can easily run several
88
million dollars or even more. In the recent high-profile proxy fight at chemicals giant
DuPont, for example, the company spent $15 million and the (unsuccessful) challenger
spent $8 million on their respective campaigns. 89 That may seem like an extreme example
today, but it may prove commonplace if current trends continue.

90

Given these massive sums at stake, who pays for all this? The rules of law are well-

established and simple. On the incumbent side, the sitting members of the board may spend
91
This is permitted
the corporation's money in support of their re-election campaign.
because "it is in the interest of the stockholders that the management inform them

concerning the policy which has been followed and the reasons therefor" before they cast
92
their proxy vote. Now, incumbents are only allowed to spend a "reasonable" amount of
corporate money for this purpose, but this is a weak constraint, as the board's decisions
93
Also, incumbents may
will receive ample deference under the business judgment rule.

not dip into corporate treasury in support of a campaign that is merely over "personality,"
as opposed to corporate policy.

94

This exception is more theoretical than real, however,

'9 5
Like
since "matters of policy ordinarily cannot be separated from matters of personnel."

84. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 64, § 13.2.
85. Emerson & Latcham, supra note 8, at 397; see also Daniel M. Friedman, Expenses of CorporateProxy
Contests, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 951, 951 n.5 (1951) (relaying that "the successful proxy contest which ousted the
management of Fairchild Engine and Camera Company in 1949 cost the victorious contestants $127,556, while
the incumbent management expended about $133,996").
86. See Harris, The Politicsof Shareholder Voting, supranote 26, at 1805 n. 199 ("In 2003, 2004, and 2005
the average cost to a soliciting shareholder of a proxy contest [was] $368,000.") (internal quotation mark omitted);
William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets,95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403 (2007) (noting "the average
cost ranges between $250,000 and $1 million") (citing a 2006 publication); cf Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch,
How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposalfor Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 300
(2003) (noting a "2001 Bloomberg Markets article report[ing] that shareholder-sponsored proxy contests cost an
average of $6.2 million each").
87. Recall that many are settled. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69 (discussing the increasing
number of proxy contest over time).
88. See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision
Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 623 tbl.7A (2013) (modeling the waging of a proxy contest as costing an average
of $5.94 million).
89. Pamela Park, Proxy Battles Prove Costly for Companies, 2015 WL 2364603 (May 19, 2015).
90. See David Reilly, Activists Hunt Big Game, but Big Banks Remain Elusive, WALL STREET J., Oct. 12,
2015, at C6 ("General Electric, Microsoft, Apple. All are massive companies that have come into activist
investors' sights, signaling that there is almost no game too big for them.").
91. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 292 (N.Y. 1955) (stating
"directors of a corporation may ... in good faith incur reasonable and proper expenses in soliciting proxies");
Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 227 (Del. Ch. 1934).
92. Friedman, supra note 85, at 953; Rosenfeld, 128 N.E.2d at 293; Hall, 171 A. at 227.
93. Rosenfeld, 128 N.E.2d at 293.
94. Hall, 171 A. at 227; Rosenfeld, 128 N.E.2d at 292.
95. See Friedman, supra note 85, at 952 (stating "opposition to the incumbent directors is usually based
upon the policy they have pursued").
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politicians, directors stand for certain policies (e.g., "Obamacare" 96 ) and a vote for them is
a vote for the policies they support. 97 As a result, in summary, the corporation itself
finances incumbent directors' re-election campaigns.
Things are a little more interesting on the insurgent side, as they are outsiders and
cannot direct the company to write a check on their behalf.9 8 Thus, a dissident campaign
for one or more directorships must be financed by its proponents. That said, if the
insurgents succeed in being elected to the board, they may be retroactively reimbursed by
the corporation for their campaign expenses. 99 The rationale is that, by winning the
election, their policy views have been vindicated by a majority of the shareholders and they
have thus conferred a benefit on the corporation. 100 If the insurgents fail, however, they
have no right of reimbursement and must simply eat their losses. 101
That is it. Those are all the legal rules of corporate campaign finance, and they have
102
remained unchanged for many decades.
C. The Golden Leash as a Form of CampaignFinance
The very simple legal framework just described may no longer suffice in the age of
shareholder activism and multi-million dollar corporate campaigns. In particular, one
aspect of corporate campaign finance that recently emerged as a flashpoint is the so-called
"golden leash." 10 3 A golden leash is a contract between an activist shareholder running a
proxy contest and her director-candidates providing that the activist will pay the latter a
supplemental compensation, over and above the ordinary director fees paid by the company
to all directors. This is generally designed to be performance-based compensation that is
linked to gains in share price during her term as a director and may amount to millions of
dollars-many times the regular director fees paid by the corporation. For perspective, the

See, e.g., Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama Legacy Staked to Affordable Care Act's Outcome, WALL
Sept. 27, 2013, at A4 (reporting that Republicans and President Obama alike refer to the "Affordable
Care Act" as "Obamacare").
97. See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("[P]olicy and personnel do not exist in
separate compartments. A change in personnel is sometimes indispensable to a change of policy. A new board
may be the symbol of the shift in policy as well as the means of obtaining it."); Hall, 171 A. at 228.
98. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008) ("Generally, and under
the current framework for electing directors in contested elections, only board-sponsored nominees for election
.
are reimbursed for their election expenses. Dissident candidates are not .
99. Steinberg,90 F. Supp. at 608.
100. See Friedman, supra note 85, at 956 ("If the opposition is successful-which means that the
stockholders reject the incumbent management and/or its policies and elect a new group to succeed it, or defeat
the management's proposals-the victorious group would appear to have as strong, if not a stronger, claim to
reimbursement than the defeated management had a right to use corporate funds.").
101. Id. at 958; see also id. at 958-61 (reporting on "the absence of any reported decisions" where an
unsuccessful dissident group was reimbursed by the corporation, even though at least some conferred a corporate
benefit by providing shareholders with relevant information).
102. Thus, leading corporate law casebooks continue to employ cases from the 1950s and '60s on this point.
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIP, LLCS, AND CORPORATIONS 504-10 (9th ed. 2015) (reprinting Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), and Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291
(N.Y. 1955)); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
163-64 (4th ed. 2012) (reprinting Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955)).
103. See Cain et al., supra note 20, at 666-71 (describing the golden leash).
96.

STREET J.,
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average annual director compensation at an S&P 500 company is about $250,000.104
The golden leash provides clear benefits to the corporation, including an increased
ability to recruit talented, world-class directors to serve on its board. 105 And yet placing
directors on the payroll of a third party in this way has led some to criticize the golden
10 6
leash as a "bribe" that could corrupt the director and ultimately the entire corporation.
This concern has led some corporations to amend their bylaws to prohibit golden leash
108
payments, 1 0 7 although many such bylaws were later retracted.
The concept of a golden leash seems to have first emerged in 2013, when two activist
investors ran proxy contests with golden leash payments in place. 109 In the first one, hedge
fund Elliot Management commenced a short-slate proxy contest to elect five directors for
the board of the energy company, Hess Corp., and promised each candidate a "a fiftythousand-dollar retainer by Hess regardless of performance, [plus] an additional thirty
thousand dollars for every percentage point the stock price outperformed industry peers,
up to a maximum of nine million dollars." 1 10 Eventually, Elliot and Hess's incumbent
board settled the matter by appointing three of Elliot's director-candidates to Hess's board,
but only after they foreswore any golden leash payments.1 11 In the second one, hedge fund
Jana Partners also ran a short-slate proxy contest at agricultural-supplier Agrium Inc. and
promised candidates a performance-based golden leash that was potentially worth tens of
millions of dollars. 112 Jana declined to settle, but its candidates ultimately lost the election
1 13
to the incumbent slate.
The year 2014 marked the first instance of a golden leash actually being put into
practice, specifically at Dow Chemical Co. In that case, as in the others, hedge fund Third
Point threatened to launch a short-slate proxy contest with a golden leash contract for its
director-candidates. 114 In a settlement, Third Point agreed not to commence the proxy
contest and Dow Chemical added a few of the hedge fund's directors to the board, without
104. Jeff Green & Hideki Suzuki, BoardDirectorPay Hits Record $251,000 for 250 Hours, BLOOMBERG
(May 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-30/board-director-pay-hits-record-251-000-for-250hours.html.
105. For example, in its proxy contest at Agrium, a giant Canadian distributor of fertilizer, which included
golden leash payments, one of Jana's director-nominees was a former Canadian Minister of Agriculture. In a
presentation filed with the SEC, Jana specifically stated that its golden leash payment was necessary to "get the
most qualified people to stand as nominees." Jana Partners, LLC, Supplemental Presentation to Proxy Advisors,
(Mar. 21, 2013), www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/943003/000110465913023600/al3-6908_3ex99dh.htm.
106. See Coffee, supra note 56 (analyzing whether golden leash payments are "Incentives or Bribes?").
107. Such a bylaw is known as a "Wachtell Bylaw," Cain et al., supranote 20, at 652, and is addressed infra
Section V.B. 1.
108. See Cain et al., supra note 20, at 653, 677 (discussing retracted bylaws); infra Section V.B.1.
109. Cain et al., supra note 20, at 663-71 (recounting the history of the golden leash); Adam Prestidge,
Activist Compensation of BoardNominees and the Middle Ground Response, 11 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 307, 30809 (2015).
110. Prestidge, supranote 109, at 315.
111. Id. at309.
112. Id.
113. See Ben Dummett & Chester Dawson, Agrium Defeats Jana Slate, WALL STREET J., Apr. 10, 2013, at
B2 (reporting that after a "bitter proxy fight," "Agrium Inc. quashed an attempt by New York hedge fund Jana
Partners LLC to install a slate of directors on the board of the Calgary-based fertilizer company").
114. Donna Dabney, MaintainingIntegrity: Golden Leashes Back on the Board Table, CONFERENCE BD.
GOVERNANCE CTR. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2014), http://tcbblogs.org/govemance/2014/12/08/maintaining-integritygolden-leashes-back-on-the-board-table.

2016]

FinancingCorporateElections
115

requiring them to abandon their golden leashes.
Thoughtful commentators have expressed their support for the golden leash,
importantly including the well-known proxy advisors, Glass Lewis and Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), both of whom have threatened to withhold support for any
116
incumbent director who tries to ban the golden leash without shareholder approval.
Proponents of the practice argue that the golden leash benefits all shareholders by getting
highly qualified people to join dissident slates and, once on the board, to push for business
decisions that will result in a higher share price. 117 The golden leash's supporters see it as
an innovative tool for activist investors to employ in order to recruit great candidates, and
to incentivize such directors to raise the share price. 11 8 Not only that, but the golden leash
payment is "borne entirely by the activist, not the company itself," or so the argument
goes. 119 In this way, shareholders are "put in the position of free-riders, enjoying the
positive externality of the nominees' incentive to perform without bearing any of the
cost."' 12 0 In short, the activist investor spends huge sums of its own money-both the cost
of the insurgent campaign (several million dollars) 12 1 and the cost of the golden leash
(millions of dollars per director) 122-to benefit the corporation and all of its shareholders.
12 3
To critics of the golden leash, however, this all sounds a little too good to be true.
To them, it is naive to presume that the activist investor expects to get nothing more than
any other shareholder out of the corporation once her favored directors are on the board.
Rather, according to critics of the structure, the golden leash is more likely designed to
yield a personal benefit for the sponsoring shareholder, potentially at the expense of the
corporation or the other shareholders. 124 To understand why, it makes sense to recall
corporate law scholarship has long taken it for granted that rational shareholders at large
125
public companies will not launch a proxy contest because of the "free-rider problem."
The idea is that the dissident shareholder that runs a proxy contest must personally incur
the expense and uncertainty of the campaign, but the benefits that she provides (e.g.,
electing more-effective directors to the board) will be spread among all shareholders

Cain et al., supra note 20, at 653-54.
Jack Ferdon, Restrictionson Compensationfor DissidentNominees EncounterShareholderOpposition,
GLASS LEWIS & CO. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.glasslewis.com/blog/restrictions-compensation-dissidentDirector
SERVICES,
SHAREHOLDER
INSTITUTIONAL
nominees-encounter-shareholder-opposition;
Qualification/CompensationBylaws FAQs (Jan. 13, 2014), www.issgovemance.com/files/directorqualificati
oncompensationbylaws.pdf; see also David Benoit, ISS Backs DirectorPay Plan-The two members placed by
Third Point are to be paidbasedon Dow's shareperformance, WALL STREET J., Apr. 23, 2015, at C2 (reporting
that "Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. gave 'cautious support' to the golden leash).
117. See Yaron Nili, Servants of Two Masters? The FeignedHysteria over Activist-PaidDirectors, 18 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 509, 522-23,569-70 (2016) (presenting these arguments); Prestidge, supra note 109, at 333; Jana,
supranote 105, at 18-24.
118. Jana, supra note 105.
119. Cain et al., supra note 20, at 670.
120. Id.
121. Supra notes 86 & 88.
122. See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 20, at 667 (observing that Jana's nominees in its proxy fight at Agrium
stood to earn "millions of dollars" from their golden leashes, amounts "far greater than standard directors' fees").
123. Cf, e.g., Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. C.I.R., 299 F.3d 221,235 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing, "experience
shows that when something seems too good to be true that probably is the case").
124. Coffee, supranote 56.
125. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 689 (discussing proxy contests and the free rider problem).
115.
116.
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equally. 12 6 Given that she internalizes the costs but shares the gains, a rational shareholder
would not launch a proxy contest even when the expected benefit to the corporation and its
shareholder body is significant. 127 This is an intuitive idea and one borne out by decades
of very few proxy contests. So why now, all of a sudden, are activist shareholders interested
in running proxy contests (and paying golden leashes)? Are they really willing to let other
128
shareholders free ride on their efforts?
Opponents of the golden leash think not. In their view, the old story is still true and it
remains irrational for a single shareholder to run a proxy contest in order to confer a general
benefit on the corporation as a whole, or to the shareholders as a body. That said, it could
be perfectly rational for a lone shareholder to run a proxy contest to achieve some sort of
personal or private benefit for herself. To critics of the practice, this is where the golden
leash comes in: The payment creates "an incentive for the director to favor the interests of
the shareholder that is paying him or her rather than the interests of all shareholders," or
the corporation itself. 129 For this reason, other thoughtful commentators have criticized the
130
golden leash and sought to ban it or at least limit it in some way.
Both sides make strong arguments, but this author thinks that neither side has focused
sufficient analytical attention to the nature of the golden leash: What is it? Before deciding
whether the golden leash merits one's support, it is surely vital to first endeavor to
understand it, and the golden leash can be categorized in a number of ways. It is, as it is
commonly understood to be, a form of compensation for service as a director. But I think
it is important to recognize that the golden leash is also a campaign contribution paid by
one shareholder to a director-candidate in a contested proxy contest.
Proponents of the golden leash make no secret that the purpose of the payment is to
induce the candidate to launch a campaign. The hedge funds that have pioneered its use
expressly claim that they pay golden leashes in order to get "highly-qualified people to join
dissident slates." 13 1 It is true that in most cases to date, golden leash agreements call for
the bulk of the payments to be paid out after the director wins her election and commences
service on the board. Even so, the promise to make the payment is made, and becomes
binding as a contract, during or prior to the campaign. 13 2 And this method is not necessary
to the concept of a golden leash. In Jana's proxy fight at Agrium, for instance, the
candidates on Jana's dissident slate were paid just for running. 133 The sponsoring hedge
fund promised its director-candidates a sizeable golden leash payment even if they lost the

126. See id ("Although challengers must bear their full costs, they can capture only a fraction of the benefits
that the contest confers on the shareholders collectively.").
127. See id.at 690 ("[E]ven though mounting a challenge would be beneficial in [certain] circumstances
from the perspective of the shareholders collectively, it would not be worthwhile from the potential challenger's
private perspective ....").
128. See Cain et al., supra note 20, at 670 (describing shareholders as "free riders" on activists' efforts).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 56 (reciting criticisms of the golden leash). The very term "golden leash"
is said to be "perjorative." Gelles, infra note 142.
13 1. See Jana, supra note 105, at 19 (noting "shareholders often need to provide additional incentive to get
highly-qualified people to join dissident slates").
132. Part of the payment is commonly made upfront, at the outset of the directorial campaign. See, e.g., Cain
et al., supra note 20, at 668 (discussing an example of an upfront payment). This is typically a small component
of the overall golden leash payment, however, and the present analysis does not depend on it.
133. Supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
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134
election-which they did.
At its most basic, then, the golden leash is a transfer of consideration, contingent as it
may be, from a shareholder to a director-candidate in support of her about-to-be-launched
campaign. The same shareholder who is willing to pay a golden leash is also willing to bear
all the costs of running the campaign. The point is that such a shareholder fits well into the
conceptual framework of third-party campaign finance, where one party pays the expenses
of the political campaign of another.
Accepting the golden leash as a campaign contribution, is it normatively desirable?
Supporters might accurately point out that individual shareholders have always funded
their insurgent campaigns themselves, and that the law has never taken the view that
dissident directors elected to the board are beholden in some sense to the shareholder
funding the campaign. Furthermore, experience shows directors elected as part of a
dissident slate can act independently of their benefactor, as in the attempted hostile
takeover of Airgas by Air Products. 135 In that case, Air Products made several premium
bids for Airgas, but the incumbent board opposed the takeover and took steps to defend
against it. 136 Air Products then commenced a successful proxy contest at Airgas in which
its dissident candidates took over one-third of the board seats. 137 Upon joining the board
of Airgas, and apparently learning new information known only to the board, however,
these new "dissident" directors sided with the incumbents and continued defending against
the takeover. 138 Thus, law and experience demonstrate that a director whose campaign is
funded by a given shareholder does not thereby become beholden to her sponsor and can
remain independent of that shareholder.
Without questioning that proposition, critics would say that the golden leash presents
something new and different. Indeed, the golden leash can potentially be seen as a direct
response to the independence of dissident directors as shown in cases like Airgas. If paying
for her campaign is not enough to guarantee that a dissident director will follow through
on a favored business plan, then perhaps paying the director directly would do the trick.
Hence the name golden leash.
It bears noting that by paying a candidate directly, the golden leash goes beyond the
usual conception of campaign finance, in the sense of financing the expenses of a
campaign. Dissident shareholders, like those who finance political campaigns, have always
paid for things like a candidate's travel expenses incurred during the course of the
campaign. What is new in the golden leash is that the insurgent pays compensation directly
to the director as consideration for her to stand for election or serve on the board. In this
way the golden leash, while similar to political campaign finance, goes much farther than
a political backer ever could. In the political sphere, people may contribute money to a

134. See Dummet & Dawson, supra note 113 (discussing Jana's failed bid at Agrium).
135. See generally Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 2011) (discussing the
attempted takeover); Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Productsv. Airgas and the Value ofStrategic Judicial
Decision-Making,2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 502 (2012) (same).
136. Davidoff, supra note 135, at 515-16.
137. Only one-third of the seats were up for election that year because Airgas had a staggered board with
three classes. Davidoff, supra note 135, at 509.
138. See Oral Arguments in A Hypothetical Appeal of Air Products v. Airgas to the Delaware Supreme
Court, 116 PA. ST. L. REV. 811, 812 (2012) ("The Airgas board, including the three new members who had been
elected at Air Products' urging, unanimously rejected this offer as inadequate.").
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candidate's campaign, but not to the candidate herself. Campaign expenses-printing,
travel, consultants, etc.-may be funded by outside parties, but payments to a candidate
herself are forbidden. 13 9 The law is obviously-and rightfully-concerned about the
possibility that direct payments to a candidate will breed corruption among government
officials whom we should reasonably fear might act to favor their benefactor once in
power. 140
The potential for corruption that the golden leash creates is almost too simple to put
into words, 14 1 and a number of commentators have voiced their concern. 142 Professor
Stephen Bainbridge has weighed in against them, 143 as has famed investor Warren
Buffett. 144 The leading corporate law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz (Wachtell
Lipton), for its part, has enumerated no fewer than six distinct "threats" posed by the golden
leash. 145 And Professor John Coffee has analogized the golden leash to a bribe intended to
advance the goals of the sponsor at the potential cost to the corporation. 14 6 He fears that
large golden leash payments "can give rise to a conflict of interest that induces a director
14 7
to subordinate his or her own judgment to that of the institution paying the director."
Such arrangements "create the wrong incentives, fragment the board, and imply a shift
'14 8
towards both the short-term and greater risk."

139. If Ben or Jerry were to hire Bernie Sanders at $1000 per hour to work at their ice cream shop for a fortyhour week, that would appear to represent either a $39,000 contribution to the Sanders for President campaign
(well over the legal limit of about $2000), or an illegal bribe to Sanders.
140. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1 ("The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare
that large campaign contributions to political candidates create the potential for corruption .... ").
141. See Stephen Bainbridge, Can Corporate Directors Take Third Party Pay from Hedge Funds?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 8, 2013), www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2013/04
/can-corporate-directors-take-third-party-pay-from-hedge-funds.htm ("If this nonsense is not illegal, it ought to
be.").
142. See, e.g., David Gelles, Debate Over Activists'PayingofBoardNominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013,
at BI ("[C]ompanies say that it is not clear who the activist[-compensated] director is really working for-its
shareholders, or the hedge fund."); David A. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update:
Boardroom Confidentiality Under Focus, N.Y.L.J. 1, 5 (Jan. 23, 2014) (describing the golden leash as "deeply
problematic" and "an unfortunate practice"); Neil Whoriskey, Golden Leashes, HonestBrokers, Risk Tolerances
& Market Imperfections:Incentive Schemesfor Activist InvestorNominees, 21 CORP. Gov. ADVISOR4, 2013 WL
8711390 (July 9, 2013) (noting that the golden leash is seen by some as an "atrocity" but finding comfort in the
fact that courts "will always scrutinize these arrangements").
143. Bainbridge, supra note 141.
144. Mark Rogers, GM, Harry Wilson, and the Disturbing Rise of the Golden Leash, FORBES (Mar. 11,
2015), www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2015/03/11/gm-harry-wilson-and-the-disturbing-rise-ofthe-golden-leash/#768208df2083 (reporting on comments by Warren Buffett critical of a proposed golden leash
at General Motors); Mike Spector et al., GMSets Buyback, Averting ProxyFight, WALL STREET J., Mar. 9, 2015,
at B 1 (reporting that "Warren Buffett ... suggested the [golden leash at GM] created a short-term incentive. 'It's
just not the way to run a business,' said Mr. Buffett .... ").
145. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, ShareholderActivism Update: Bylaw ProtectionAgainst Dissident
DirectorConflict/Enrichment Schemes, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 10, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/10/bylaw-protection-against-dissident-director-conflictenrichmentschemes/.
146. Coffee, supra note 56; see Gelles, supranote 142 ("When boards disagree, it's better that they not think
it's being done because certain directors are being bribed" through a golden leash compensation scheme.) (quoting
John Coffee).
147. Coffee, supra note 56.
148. Id.

2016]

FinancingCorporateElections

One way a golden leash may lead to pernicious results is in the context of a takeover
offer made at a premium, but where the corporation may be worth more over the long run
if the offer is rejected. In the past, the board could conclude that the company should reject
such an offer, even if the shareholders are strongly in favor of it. 149 The board has the
power to block a deal in order to protect the long-term value of the company, as they did
in Airgas, even if a majority of the shareholders are "so focused on the short-term that they
would take a smaller harvest in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian
Summer." 150 But if golden leashes are in place, and one or more directors are receiving a
side payment from a shareholder with a relatively short time horizon, there is a legitimate
concern that the board will feel internal pressure to accede to the deal despite their
misgivings. 15 1 In short, the critics' concern that the golden leash can engender a short-term
focus appears valid.
In response to the concern over short-termism, golden leash supporters point out that
directors and officers are commonly paid on the basis of share-price performance over a
few years and thus a golden leash with a similar design is not a cause for worry. 152 Be that
as it may, the source of the compensation is different. Directors fees have always been paid
out by the corporation, itself a perpetual entity. 153 By contrast, recipients of a golden leash
would be predominantly paid by an activist shareholder, whose average holding period is
relatively short. 15 4 It is easy to imagine that a director subject to a golden leash might feel
beholden to the patron and be more inclined to pursue a plan designed to generate a shortterm increase in the share price (e.g., cutting research and development) regardless of the
15 5
long-term effects of such a course.
In response to the corruption concern, defenders of the golden leash claim that it
cannot cause harm to the company, even if a director becomes beholden to the sponsor of
her golden leash. Since she is just one director, any harmful proposal she makes will easily
149. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 111-13 (Del. Ch. 2011) (holding in the
affirmative on the question of whether, "if a majority of stockholders want to tender into an inadequately priced
offer, is that... a threat that justifies continued maintenance of the poison pill?: where a majority of shareholders
'would be happy to tender their shares' ... regardless of the potential long-term value of the company," this "is
a clear 'risk' under the teachings of TW Services and Paramount.");Martin Lipton, Just Say No: the Long TermValue of the Poison Pill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec, 18, 2015),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/18/the-long-term-value-of-the-poison-pill/ ("Nearly six years ago, Air
Products made an unsolicited all-cash bid to acquire Airgas for $60 per share (later increased to $70), to which
the board of directors of Airgas said 'no.' [Last month,] Airgas agreed to be sold to Air Liquide at a price of $143
).
per share, in cash, nearly 2.4x Air Products' original $60 offer and more than double the final $70 offer.
150. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 16 A.3d at 111 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See Cain et al., supra note 20, at 671 ("Normally, the board of directors is thought to counterbalance
the short term interests of such shareholders. However, if [activist] shareholders are able to put their nominees on
the board and use potentially lucrative pay packages to ensure that those nominees continue to focus on shortterm rewards, the activists damage the long term health of the corporation," according to critics of the golden
leash.).
152. Jana, supranote 105, at 23.
153. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(5) (2010) (providing that a "corporation shall have perpetual
existence" unless otherwise provided in its certificate of incorporation); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual
Corporation,80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 812 (2012) (discussing the perpetual nature of the corporate form).
154.

Alon Brav, et al., Hedge FundActivism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185,205(2009) (reporting

that activists hold large blocks (greater than 5%) of target stock for about nine months, on average); cf id.
(reporting that activists' total average holding period is "close to two years").
155. See Cain et al., supra note 20, 667-68, 670-71 (taking note of this concern).
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be voted down by the rest of the board. 1 5 6 But this line of argument cannot be correct. In
the political context, even one corrupt government official is too many. Imagine a U.S.
Senator who accepted bribes and then defended her behavior on the ground that she had
only one vote out of 100! The idea is laughable because the law is and should be concerned
with the corruption of individual politicians and directors, and it is not necessary that an
entire majority become corrupt before we take action. For one thing, one rotten apple can
spoil the bunch. If non-corrupt directors see their corrupt brethren are getting rich without
consequences, they may give up their morals and join them in their corrupt ways. For
another, individual directors can clearly influence the board's agenda and deliberations, as
well as act on board committees. 15 7 These represent real sources of power that could be
used to corrupt ends.
In conclusion, the age of the activist has brought with it proxy contests that look like
political campaigns-and present analogous issues of campaign finance. The golden leash
is a novel idea that has the potential to benefit corporations and shareholders alike by
enhancing the ability of dissidents to challenge incumbents and by placing talented
individuals on the board. But the large direct payments from one shareholder to a favored
director also clearly raises the specter of corruption. A director-candidate who receives
financial support, such as a golden leash, may be tempted to advance the interests of her
sponsor over those of the corporation or the shareholders at large. She is only human, after
all.158

The debate over the golden leash has a familiar ring to it. The interests and issues at
stake in corporate campaign finance closely parallel those at stake in political campaign
finance. The legitimacy of the electoral process is paramount in both political and corporate
governance, making it vital to ensure that a dissident campaign can obtain sufficient
financial support to present a real threat to the incumbent. On the other hand, there are very
159
good reasons to worry about the corrupting power of money.
In the political sphere, these difficult issues have been thoughtfully analyzed by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases over the past 40 years, commencing with Buckley v.
Valeo and continuing through Citizens United and other key precedents that collectively
establish the so-called "Buckley framework." With this in mind, rather than analyzing the
golden leash and other forms of corporate campaign finance in a vacuum, Part III looks to
the political arena and the Buckley framework for guidance. After that, Part IV will adapt

156. See Nili, supra note 117, at 554 ("As a minority, even if we assume the worst of intentions, these
directors would still need to convince enough of their peers to gain majority. [If a proposal would] clearly benefit
the activist [at] the expense of the firm and other shareholders, such persuasion would be extremely unlikely.").
157. Cf Joann S. Lublin, Inside America's Boardrooms:Two-Person BoardPanels Live On, WALL STREET
J., Jan. 28, 2016, at B1 (reporting that two-member board committees are found at "some of America's biggest
companies").
158. See Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 765 (Del. Ch. 1986) (observing that corporate law is
"sensitive to the weakness of human nature").
159. See, e.g., William Y. Rashbaum & Susanne Craig, Skelos andSon Are FoundGuilty in US. Graft Case,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12,2015, at Al (relaying that Dean Skelos, the former majority leader of the New York Senate,
was found guilty of federal corruption charges; "[elvidence and testimony showed how some lawmakers can
wield their considerable power to extort benefits for themselves or others"); Benjamin Weiser & Susanne Craig,
Silver Convicted on All 7 Counts in U.S. Graft Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2015, at Al (reporting that Sheldon
Silver, who spent "more than two decades as the [New York] State Assembly speaker," was found guilty of
corruption; "he obtained nearly $4 million in exchange for [ab]using his position").
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the Buckley framework to the corporate context. Part V will then apply that mode of
analysis to the specific example of the golden leash.
III. TIE BUCKLEYFRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

Campaigns for public office cost a tremendous amount of money. 160 The price of
advertising, polling, hosting events, etc. adds up to vast sums. A typical successful U.S.
Senate race, for instance, costs about $10 million, 16 1 and even smaller campaigns, such as
a local election in a small city, can easily exceed $10,000.162 Since very few candidates
possess sufficient wealth to finance such campaigns on their own, politicians tend to have
to count on others to finance and support their campaigns. 163 This mixture of money and
politics, however, raises important concerns, including that those who finance a campaign
may unduly affect the outcome of the election or the behavior of the politicians once
elected. 164 Hence the financing of campaigns for political office have been the subject of
state and federal regulation for more than a century, including the Federal Election
Campaign Act in the 1970s and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act in the 1990s. 16 5 But
the government's power to limit or regulate campaign finance is subject to stringent review
under the First Amendment, as explained in this Part.
A. The Constraintof the FirstAmendment: The Buckley Framework
In the landmark 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that the
government's power to promulgate campaign finance laws is constrained by the First
Amendment. 166 The Court's theory was this: the nature of our vast country and huge
population renders it impossible to shout from a street comer and have the entire electorate
hear one's message. To reach a nationwide (or even a statewide or citywide) audience, it
is vital to spend money. 167 In shorthand, "money is speech." 16 8 Therefore, any

160. DANIEL P. TOKAI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 273 (2013).
161. Paul Steinhauser & Rober Yoon, Cost to Win Congressional Election Rockets, CNN (July 11, 2013,
4:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/1 1/politics/congress-election-costs/.
162. See, e.g.,
City of Boulder Election Reports, CITY OF BOULDER COLORADO,
https://bouldercolorado.gov/elections/election-summary-reports (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) (indicating that nine
separate campaigns spent more than $15,000 each in the 2015 election for city council of Boulder, Colorado).
163. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) ("Under a system of private financing of elections, a
candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to
provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign.").
164. TOKAJI, supranote 160, at 273.
165. The first major federal campaign finance law was the 1907 Tillman Act, which banned federal campaign
contributions from nationally chartered banks and corporations. R. Sam Garrett, The State of Campaign Finance
Policy: Recent Developments andIssuesforCongress, CONG. RES. SER. 1 n. 1 (Apr. 30, 2015).

166. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (per curiam); see also NEUBORNE, supranote 77, at 234 n.33 ("The fragmented
series of per curiam and individual opinions in Buckley usually shake out to seven to one, with Chief Justice
Burger dissenting and Justice Stevens not participating.").
167. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 ("[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society
requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and
circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The
electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made
these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.").
168.

See MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 250-51 (2013)
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government-imposed limit on campaign finance necessarily constrains the First
Amendment right to free speech. 169 Accordingly, the Buckley court concluded that courts
must strictly scrutinize campaign finance laws and require the government to show that its
law or regulation furthers a "compelling interest" and is "narrowly tailored" to achieve that
interest. 170 This mode of analysis is known as the "Buckley framework" and it is still good
law today.

17

1

The Buckley decision itself grounded its holding on the idea that the speech at issue
in political campaigns-"You should cast your vote for A because of x and y'"-is simply
so core to the First Amendment that the courts must guard it vigilantly against legislative
infringement. 172 A close read of the per curiam opinion, however, reveals an additional
rationale for the strict rule imposed by Buckley, one premised on the foundational
importance of preserving popular sovereignty and a republican form of government. 1 7 3 As
discussed above in the Introduction, a "republican" form of government is one in which
the people elect representatives to govern on their behalf. 174 The related concept of
"popular sovereignty" is the idea that "all power resides with the people and that it is only
by their consent that the people may be governed."1 75 They are foundational to our national
charter as can be seen by the fact that they are discussed at length in both The Federalist
Papers 176 and the Declaration of Independence. 1 77 The U.S. Constitution specifically
guarantees a "republican form of government" to each state, 178 and its Preamble begins
with the words "We the people..." thus demonstrating the paramount importance of these

("'Money is speech.' Not literally, of course .... 'Money is speech' means that the First Amendment has
something to say about the constitutionality of the use of money in connection with speech.").
169. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 ("A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the
at 19 n.18
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached."); id.
("Being free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to
drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.").
170. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
171. See, e.g., J. Robert Abraham, Saving Buckley: Creatinga Stable CampaignFinanceFramework, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 1078, 1081 (2010) (employing the term).
172. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 ("It can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.") (quoting Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (stating "there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs ... of course includ(ing) discussions of candidates.") (citing, inter alia, Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (discussing our "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open")).
173. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 154 ("In a republic... the people are sovereign."); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270
("Debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution.").
174. See Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666 (1884) ("In a republican government, like ours.... political
power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people ...").
175. Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez From the Off. of U.S. Sen. v. Wells, 7 A.3d 720, 763 (N.J. 2010).
176. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 244 (James Madison) (stating that the House of Representatives
would "derive its powers from the people of America").
177. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments ...deriv[e] their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed.").
178. U.S. CONST. Art. TV, § 4. Our national government is likewise republican in form. U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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foundational importance of popular sovereignty. 179 In the years since the founding,
countless judicial opinions, including many by the Supreme Court, wax poetic on this
aspect of our government. 180 In short, there can be no doubt that popular sovereignty and
a republican form of government are among the most important principles upon which the
United States was founded, and they remain paramount today.
The republican concept, however, suffers a serious flaw in that the "machinery of
democracy"-such as ballot boxes and voting days-is controlled by the government itself,

thereby creating "a risk that those who currently hold office-current legislators--can
regulate elections in a way that insulates themselves improperly [from] competition and ...
undermines the integrity and accountability that should be central to democracy and
democratic elections." 18 1 One aspect of the machinery of democracy is the regulation of
campaign finance, and it is easy to see that the incumbent government officials can use
campaign finance laws to hamstring the competition and perpetuate themselves in
office.

182

If such behavior were allowed, legislators could negate popular sovereignty and

undermine the republican form of government; and they have every incentive to do so.

183

Hence, one rationale for the strict Buckley framework is that the courts must defend the

republican form against the legislature's inherent interest in self-perpetuating government.
This "republican rationale" for the Buckley framework is widely discussed in the
18 4
and has become an important component of the Court's Buckley framework
scholarship

179. U.S. CONST. Art. IW,§ 4.
180. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("In a republic ... the people are sovereign ...
Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891) (stating "the people are ... the source of political power");
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404-05 (1819) ("The government of the Union ...is, emphatically, and
truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by
them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 479
(1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (referring to the "great and glorious principle[], that the people are the sovereign of
this country").
181. Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, andBalancing in Campaign
FinanceLaw After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 869 (2007).
182. See Michael J. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicialReview: The EntrenchmentProblem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491,
522 (1997) ("Legislators drafting campaign finance reform legislation have an obvious incentive to advantage
incumbents vis-A-vis challengers.").
183. See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 101 (2014) (stating the Buckley framework protects the people against "self-serving behavior" on
the part of the government "and, ultimately, tyranny"); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S.
652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The premise of our Bill of Rights, however, is that there are some
things-even some seemingly desirable things-that government cannot be trusted to do. The very first of these
is establishing the restrictions upon speech that will assure 'fair' political debate. The incumbent politician who
says he welcomes full and fair debate is no more to be believed than the entrenched monopolist who says he
welcomes full and fair competition."); Elena Kagan, PrivateSpeech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 470 (1996) ("Campaign finance laws like those in
Buckley easily can serve as incumbent-protection devices, insulating current officeholders from challenge and
criticism.").
184. See, e.g., TRIBE & MATZ, supranote 183, at 99-101; Hasen, supra note 181, at 869 (quoting Richard
H. Pildes); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 817 (1999) (observing that, with respect
to campaign finance laws, "we must always be wary of the ways that incumbents will try to draft rules that
handicap their challengers"); Klarman, supranote 182, at 522; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1577 (1988) ("There are large difficulties in designing a system of campaign finance
regulation that achieves its intended purposes and that does not serve as an incumbent protection measure."). But
see Michael S. Kang, To Herefrom Theory in Election Law, 87 TEX.L. REV. 787, 789-90 (2009) (suggesting
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over time. Buckley did not primarily ground its decision on the republican rationale
(although the Court did make reference to the United States being "a republic where the
people are sovereign" 185). On the whole, the per curiam opinion in Buckley "approached
federal regulation of campaign finance predominantly as a question of individual rights
and free speech under the First Amendment," and did not put much weight on the concern
over a republican form of government.1 8 6 Indeed, the clearest exposition of the idea within
Buckley can be found in a portion of Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion, where he
expressed concern over the "grave risks" posed by "enactments that tend to perpetuate
those who control legislative power"-but that opinion garnered no votes beyond his
18 7
own.
As the doctrine developed, however, the republican rationale came to the fore. At first,
the idea that the Buckley framework either is or should be premised on the protection of
popular sovereignty was embraced by individual Justices in their separate opinions1 88 and
scholarly publications. 189 Then, in the 2006 case of Randall v. Sorrell, a plurality of the
Court expressly relied on the republican rationale to strike down a campaign finance law
under the Buckley framework. 19 0 Two years later, the Supreme Court's majority opinion
that "entrenchment ... has not been a prominent element of scholarship or jurisprudence about ... campaign
finance"); id. at 804 (observing that "courts and commentators do not necessarily frame campaign-finance
problems... in terms of incumbent entrenchment").
185. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15; see also id.at 14 ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications
of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of govemment established by our Constitution.")
186. Kang, supra note 184, at 804.
187. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 251 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 306 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (describing the campaign finance law at issue as "an incumbency protection plan"); id at 263
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("The first instinct of power
is the retention of power, and, under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the
suppression of election-time speech."); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (opining that the Supreme Court should not defer to a legislature that enacts a campaign finance law
that "insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge"); Colo. Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S.
604, 644 n.9 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (taking note of "the potential for legislators to set the rules of the
electoral game so as to keep themselves in power and to keep potential challengers out of it"); Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 251 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (focusing attention on the "grave risks" posed by
"enactments that tend to perpetuate those who control legislative power"); see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230,
248 (2006) (observing that "individual Members of the Court have expressed concem" that campaign finance
laws can "insulat[e] legislators from effective electoral challenge"); Nathaniel Persily, FigLeaves and Tea Leaves
in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. CT. REv. 89, 105-06 (2008) ("Campaign
finance is the one context in which a majority of the current Court (though not in a single decision) has signed on
to the principle that the Constitution requires an inquiry into a regulation's effect on political competition.").
189. See Kagan, supra note 183, at 470 ("Campaign finance laws like those in Buckley easily can serve as
incumbent-protection devices, insulating current officeholders from challenge and criticism."); id. at 467-68
(viewing "the Buckley principle as an evidentiary tool designed to aid in the search for improper motive" on the
part of the government, such as "self-interest"); id. at 468 (asserting campaign finance laws "pose a significant
danger of arising from the.., desire on the part of officials to insulate themselves or their ideas from challenge").
190. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 232 (2006) ("Contribution limits that are too low also can harm
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent
officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability."); Persily, supra note 188, at 106 ("In Randall v
Sorrell, a controlling opinion for the Court, for the first time, struck down a campaign finance law-Vermont's
stringent limit on contributions-because of its anticompetitive impact on challengers."). Justice Breyer's
plurality opinion in Randall is commonly referred to as the lead or "controlling" opinion in the case. See, e.g.,
Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156 (D.D.C.), summarily af'd, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010)
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in Davis v. FEC, tacitly observed that popular sovereignty is a driver of the Buckley
framework.1 9 1 And then, in the Citizens United case of 2010, a majority of the Supreme
Court finally expressly recognized the republican rationale as the conceptual foundation
for the strict Buckley framework: "[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy," held
the Court, "for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people." 192 In light of
this case law, it is clear that the republican rationale is a central theoretical underpinning
of the Buckley framework as currently understood.
To summarize, the Buckley framework protects freedom of speech and popular
sovereignty by imposing strict scrutiny on laws that limit or regulate campaign finance.
Under this legal test, the government must show that its campaign finance law furthers a
"compelling interest" and is "narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest. 193 Over the years,
various types of campaign finance laws have been reviewed by the courts using the Buckley
framework, as have various rationales for such laws. This body of case law has established
clear guides to which government interests qualify as "compelling" and which modes of
regulation are sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to satisfy the "exacting," "strict" and
"critical" scrutiny demanded by Buckley. 194 Section III.B will discuss compelling interests;
Section III.C will discuss narrow tailoring.
B. Government Interests
The government has regulated political campaign finance for many years and in many
ways, and legal challenges to those laws have generated a body of case law that delineates
those government interests that are "compelling" from those that are not. As will appear,
most rationales for campaign finance regulation have been rejected as insufficiently
weighty to pass muster under the First Amendment.

(referring to the "controlling opinion of Breyer, J." in Randall); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion
of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 623 n.239 (2011) (describing Randall as a "fractured decision" and
referring to the "controlling opinion" by Justice Breyer); Campaign FinanceRegulation, 120 HARV. L. REv. 283,
290 (2006) (discussing Justice Breyer's "controlling opinion in Randall"). But cf Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200,
1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that Justice Breyer's plurality opinion in Randall is "persuasive" but "not
binding authority").
191. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008) ("The Constitution. . . confers upon voters, not Congress,
the power to choose the Members of the House of Representatives, Art. I, § 2, and it is a dangerous business for
Congress to use [campaign finance] laws to influence the voters' choices."); see also Rick Pildes, When Do
Campaign Finance Laws Become a Way to Protect Incumbents, BALKNIZATION (June 26, 2008, 11:37 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/sympathy-for-millionaire-self.htm
("The specter of incumbent selfentrenchment is central to today's decision [Davis], in my view.").
192. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) ("In a republic where the people are sovereign,
the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.") (citing and quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 460-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining
that concerns over incumbent self-interest underlay the majority's decision).
193. See NEUBORNE, supra note 77, at 65, 79, 120, 121 ("The Supreme Court's pervasive mistrust of
government speech regulation is reflected in the three elements of First Amendment strict scrutiny.... [T]he
government must demonstrate: (1) a 'compelling' governmental interest in regulating the speech immediately,
(2) that the regulation will actually advance the government's compelling interest, and (3) that 'less drastic
alternatives' do not exist for dealing with the government's concern. It is a rare government regulation that
survives strict scrutiny.").
194. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11 ("critical scrutiny"); id. at 16, 44, 64 ("exacting scrutiny"); id at 25 ("closest
scrutiny"); id at 75 ("strict ...scrutiny").
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1. Corruption
The first and most important basis for campaign finance regulation is that "the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined" by campaign
contributions "given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
196
holders." 19 5 For instance, "I'll give you $500,000 if you make me an ambassador."
Preventing corruption is a compelling government interest that can legitimately be used to
197
limit campaign finance even in the face of the First Amendment.
Moreover, avoiding even the appearance of corruption has also been held to be a
198
compelling government interest for purposes of First Amendment strict scrutiny.
Clearly, most large campaign contributors make their donations without any expectation
of a direct favor in return. They just support the candidate and her policy goals. But the
Supreme Court found that the government has an interest in avoiding even the appearance
199
that large donations improperly influence politicians.
The concept of corruption adopted by the Supreme Court is a narrow one that only
goes to "quid-pro-quo" corruption and expressly excludes mere "influence," "favoritism,"
or "access." 200 The nature of democratic politics is that elected representatives will favor
certain policies and hence the voters that support them as well. This is not "corrupt" in the
quid-pro-quo sense that the Supreme Court has recognized as a compelling interest for
regulating the campaign finance area.
2. Outside Interference
A second important interest that the government may properly invoke to regulate
campaign finance is the need to protect the domestic election process from outside
interference. Hence, a recent federal case, affirmed by the Supreme Court, expressly upheld
the government's authority to prohibit foreigners from attempting to influence American
elections. 20 1 The court held that the government has a compelling interest under Buckley
in "limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic selfgovernment, and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political

195. See id at 26-27; FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) ("The
hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.") (emphasis omitted).
196. TRIBE&MATZ, supranote 183, at97.
197. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
198. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
199. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29 ("Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities
for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.").
200. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo
corruption. The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these
officials are corrupt: 'Favoritism and influence are not ... avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature
of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and
contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the
only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will
respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy ispremised on responsiveness.')
(quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
201. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 281 (D.D.C. 2011), summarily af'd, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
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process." 202 The political process is a domestic affair and the government is on sound
footing if it acts to prevent foreign interference in our electoral process. Another type of
outside influence would be the influence of legal persons, such as corporations or unions.
been held to have the power to ban such entities from
And here too the government has
20 3
making campaign contributions.
3. Equality/Anti-Distortion
Another potential governmental interest in regulating campaign finance is the
promotion of equality or the avoidance of distortions based on wealth. 20 4 The idea is that
unfettered spending on campaigns allow wealthy people (and companies) to wield
disproportionate influence on election outcomes and policymaking. 20 5 To some, this
amounts to a "distortion" of political discourse that undermines equality by drowning out
the voices of the less well-off.20 6 In their view, the First Amendment should allow the
equality by limiting the ability of the wealthy to use their
government to enhance political
20 7
fortunes to affect elections.
This theory, however, was squarely and expressly rejected by the Supreme Court,
most notably in Citizens United.208 The problem is that the basic goal of the First
Amendment is to enhance political dialogue, not limit it; "it is our law and our tradition
that more speech, not less, is the governing rule." 20 9 The First Amendment "was designed
'to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources,' and 'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people."' 2 10 Thus, "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. ' 2 11 Rather, ideas must fight it out on the

202. Id. at 288.
203. See, e.g., Garrett, supranote 165 (discussing the Tillman Act as the first of its kind).
204. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A ConstitutionalPrincipleof Campaign Finance,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1204, 1204 (1994) (advocating for a constitutional guarantee that "each eligible voter
[possess] equal financial resources for purposes of supporting or opposing any candidate or initiative on the ballot
in any election held within the United States," on the theory that "wealthy citizens should not be permitted to
have a greater ability to participate in the electoral process simply on account of their greater wealth").
205. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (referring to "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth"); see Hasen, supra note 190, at 588 (discussing Austin).
206. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (expressing concern over "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth"); David A. Strauss, Corruption,Equality, and Campaign FinanceReform, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1369, 1369 (1994) (observing than one "objective" of campaign finance regulation is "to promote equality:
people who are willing and able to spend more money, it is said, should not have more influence over who is
elected to office").
207. See Hasen, supra note 190, at 588 (suggesting that "Austin's emphasis on preventing 'distort[ion]' of
the electoral process through large corporate spending suggested the Court in fact was espousing an equality
rationale").
208. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 183, at 100 ("Citizens United decisively rejected the anti-distortion
justification for campaign finance laws.... This is likely for the best."); see also Strauss, supra note 206, at 1369
(observing that "the Supreme Court's view.., can be summarized quickly: Corruption is a permissible target of
[campaign finance regulation]; inequality is not").
209. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 3109 361 (2010).
210. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,49 (1976) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
211. Id. at 48-49; see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 183, at 101 ("[flt would be a mistake to leave
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battlefield of public opinion, even though the fight is not completely fair:
Even if opportunities to engage in influential speech are unfairly distributed
because of income inequalities, and even if government can directly redistribute
wealth, the cure of allowing government to directly 'adjust' the distribution of
speech is worse than the disease. We are not a symphony for Congress to conduct
2 12
according to its view of fair speech rights.
Moreover, if politicians were allowed to muzzle some speakers to favor others, "they
might use that power to secure their own positions-hardly an equality-enhancing
outcome." 2 13 For all these reasons, the Buckley framework holds that equality/antidistortion is not a compelling government interest and may not be used as a basis for
2 14
regulating campaign finance.
4. More Competitive Elections

An additional possible government interest behind regulating campaign finance
would be to enhance the competitiveness of elections. When one candidate has access to
2 15
much greater financial resources than another, this could give the former an advantage.
This advantage can be neutralized through the use of certain types of campaign finance
regulation, such as "matching funds" that are triggered by expenditures on the other
2 16
side.
This potential interest has not been found to be compelling, however, for the law is
clear that the government has no legitimate interest in reducing the advantage that a wellfinanced candidate may have. 2 17 Different candidates have different strengths-some are
celebrities; some are good looking; some are wealthy. The government does not have the
power, under the First Amendment and the Buckley framework, to "mak[e] and
implement[] judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the
outcome of an election." 2 18 It is for the voters, not the incumbent politicians, to choose

judgments about the 'proper' distribution of speech to politicians. Arming them with a roving license to level the
playing field by silencing or adjusting the volume of disfavored speakers is an invitation to self-serving behavior
and, ultimately, tyranny. The anti-distortion argument can too easily lead down this dangerous path, and Citizens
United rightly discarded it.").
212. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011) ("The First
Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is
freedom-the 'unfettered interchange of ideas'-not whatever the State may view as fair."); TRIBE & MATZ,
supra note 183, at 99.
213. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 183, at 99.
214. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365; TRIBE & MATZ, supranote 183, at 99; see also id at 101 ("[flt would
be a mistake to leave judgments about the 'proper' distribution of speech to politicians. Arming them with a
roving license to level the playing field by silencing or adjusting the volume of disfavored speakers is an invitation
to self-serving behavior and, ultimately, tyranny. The anti-distortion argument can too easily lead down this
dangerous path, and Citizens United rightly discarded it.").
215. This concern is distinct, but closely related to the one considered in the last Section. The difference is
that this Section focuses on relative resources among candidates, while the last focused on the relative resources
among voters.
216. See Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2829 (striking down Arizona's matching fund law); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724, 743 (2008).
217. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2826; Davis,554 U.S. at 743.
218. Davis, 554 U.S. at 742; see also Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2826 ("[lIt is not legitimate for the government
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their elected officials, "and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws
to influence the voters' choices." 2 19 In short, there is no compelling government interest
in leveling the playing field among candidates for office.
5. Reduce Cost of Campaigns
A final potential government interest in regulating campaign finance relates to the
"skyrocketing" cost of political campaigns. 220 Because campaigns are so expensive,
candidates are forced to spend "too much time raising money rather than devoting that time
to campaigning among ordinary voters" or actually governing. 22 1 Accordingly, the
government may have some interest in reducing the cost of political campaigns, simply as
an efficiency measure. The Supreme Court, however, has expressly rejected this theory,
holding that minimizing the cost of campaigns or time spent fundraising is not a compelling
government interest under the Buckley framework. 22 2 Because it costs money to speak and
run a campaign, and because the First Amendment encourages more speech rather than
less, minimizing costs is just not an important government interest, at least not one
important enough to withstand the force of the First Amendment.
C. Methods ofRegulation
There are essentially four ways to regulate campaign finance: Expenditure limits,
contribution limits, disclosure, and public financing. Each has been adopted by important
federal campaign finance statutes, and each has been reviewed by the Supreme Court under
the Buckley framework, specifically on the "narrowly tailored" aspect. This Section
recounts the important case law on each of these four methods.
1. ContributionLimits
A contribution limit regulates the amount of money that may be donated to support a
political campaign. Most importantly, contribution limits put a ceiling on how much a
person or entity may give directly to a candidate and have largely been held to be
constitutionally permissible, even under the exacting scrutiny called for by the Buckley
framework. This is because contribution limits "entail[] only a marginal restriction upon
the contributor's ability to engage in free communication" and do not strike at the heart of
the First Amendment. 2 23 For this reason, contribution limits are subject to a somewhat

to attempt to equalize electoral opportunities in this manner.").
219. Davis, 554 U.S. at 742.
220. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
221. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 (2006).
222. Id. at 246.
223. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21 ("[L]imitation upon the amount that any one person or group may
contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability
to engage in free communication.... A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or
campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the
symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.").

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 41:4

"less searching" level of review than truly "strict" scrutiny; 2 24 as long as they are "closely
government interest, contribution limits will generally
drawn" to a "sufficiently important"
22 5
framework.
Buckley
the
satisfy
Supreme Court doctrine has recognized two such government interests that are
"sufficiently important" to support a limitation on campaign contributions. First, and most
importantly, contribution limits respond directly to the important government interest in
preventing quid pro quo corruption. 226 Direct contributions to a candidate, especially large
ones, clearly raise the specter of quid pro quo corruption. 22 7 To prevent such corruption,
the government has the constitutional power to impose reasonable limits on campaign
contributions. 228 Second, contribution limits that apply to certain classes of people and
entities, including corporations, labor unions, and foreigners (all of whom are legally
prohibited from making campaign contributions to federal candidates) 229 are justified by
the government interest in preserving the democratic process from outside interference.
Despite their general constitutionality, the Buckley framework does look askance at
contribution limits when they are so unreasonably low that their effect is to allow
"incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenges." 230 As the
Supreme Court explained in Randallv. Sorrell,a very low contribution limit can "handicap
a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the
start of the campaign," contravening the core First Amendment goal of sharing ideas and
furthering debate. 2 31 Even so, the government is given broad discretion in setting
232
contribution limits, and the courts will not engage in "fine tuning" legislative choices.
But if a contribution limit is so low that it seriously inhibits the ability of candidates to
mount effective campaigns and effectively entrenches the incumbents in office, then it
"goes too far" beyond the government's legitimate interests and violates the First
2 33
Amendment.
2. Expenditure Limits
An expenditure limit caps the direct spending on elections to a certain dollar value.
This type of limit can be imposed on a candidate as well as those closely connected with a
candidate. Such a limit may also sweep more broadly, generally limiting or banning
"independent expenditures" made by third parties. In sharp contrast to a contribution limit,
which only imposes a "marginal restriction" on the First Amendment, 234 a limit on
expenditures imposes "direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
224. TOKAJI, supra note 160, at 281-83.
225. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 ("Even a significant interference with protected rights ofpolitical association
may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
226. See supra Section HILB. 1 (discussing government interest in preventing corruption).
227. TUSHNET, supra note 168, at 251.
228. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 144.
229. Corporations and unions are totally prohibited from making contributions to candidates in federal
election. 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2015). The same rule applies for foreigners. 2 U.S.C. § 30121 (2015).
230. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000).
231. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56-57.
232. Id.at 30.
233. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006).
234. See supra Section III.C.1 (discussing contribution limits); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20.
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speech."'235 For this reason, expenditure limits are held to the strictest scrutiny under the
First Amendment, meaning that they must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest in order to pass muster. Very few expenditure limits have passed this
23 6
challenging test.
Recall that the only government interests that have been recognized as compelling in
this sense are the concern over quid pro quo corruption and the avoidance of interference
by outsiders to the political process. 237 The anti-corruption interest is clearly a strong one,
but simply inapposite to expenditure limitations: With respect to expenditures by a
candidate herself or by her campaign, there is no risk of corruption. One cannot corrupt
oneself. And with respect to independent expenditures by third parties, the "absence of
prearrangement and coordination ... alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given
as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 2 38 (By contrast, an
expenditure by a nominally independent person or entity that is actually coordinated with
a candidate or campaign raises the risk of corruption and is treated as a contribution under
the law.) 2 39 The important point is that quid pro quo corruption cannot be the basis for an
expenditure limitation. Independent people and entities are free to spend as much as they
24 0
want to publicize their views on candidates and issues.
This leaves just one potential government interest to support expenditure limitations,
namely the goal of preventing outsiders to American polity-foreigners-from interfering
24 1
with the domestic democratic process. Here, the Supreme Court has not directly spoken,
but it has summarily affirmed a lower court opinion that confirmed the government's
authority to prohibit foreign nationals from making even independent expenditures that
advocate for or against a specific candidate. 242 Even though this cuts against the First
Amendment goal of encouraging speech on political issues, the government may do so in
243
order to "prevent[] foreign influence over the U.S. political process."

235. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 ("It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict
the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions, while neutral as to the
ideas expressed, limit political expression at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms.") (citation and internal quotations omitted).
236. But cf. JOHN PAUL STEVENs, Six AMENDMENTS 72-74, 79 (2014) (suggesting that prior expenditure
limits were simply too low and proposing to amend the Constitution such that the government may impose
"reasonable" expenditure limits).
237. Supra Section 11.B.
238. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
239. TOKAJI, supra note 160, at 282-83.
240. This is why the independent-expenditure-only entities known as "SuperPACs" are allowed to spend as
they see fit to influence the electorate. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[Tlhe
government can have no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to independent expenditure-only
organizations."). But cf Richard Briffault, Super PA Cs, 96 MiNN. L. REv. 1644, 1681-82, 1685-86 (2012) ("[A]s
Super PACs are typically run by former top aides to the candidates, formal coordination of message or strategies
between candidates and their Super PACs is unnecessary.... [While Super PACs] are technically independent
of the candidates, and are not allowed to coordinate their activities with the candidates[,] in practice a [Super
PAC] is part of the campaign of the candidate it is aiding.").
241. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that "the Supreme Court has
never squarely addressed the issue" of whether political donations from foreign nationals may be banned).
242. Id. at 288.
243. Id.
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3. Disclosure
Rather than directly regulating the movement of money related to elections, as with
expenditure and contribution limits, disclosure-based regulation requires that information
about such expenditures and contributions be conveyed to the public. The identity of
donors and how much they gave, as well as a record of campaign expenditures, are typical
disclosure requirements. 2 44 Most disclosure-based campaign finance laws have been
upheld as constitutional. Unlike limits on contributions or expenditures, requiring
disclosure does not directly impede any speech, so the First Amendment infringement is
lessened. 2 45 Also, there are important government interests in mandated campaign finance
disclosure, including informing the electorate of where campaign money comes from and
how it is spent and deterring quid pro quo corruption by publicizing the identity of large
campaign contributors. 246 For these reasons, disclosure-based campaign finance regulation
is generally consistent with the First Amendment.
There is an important caveat, however. It is well known that disclosure of
contributions in support of unpopular causes can subject the donor to threats, harassment
and reprisals-from either government or private parties-and that this can "chill" core
First Amendment activity. 247 This is a serious concern, but one that depends on a case-bycase determination. Thus, disclosure laws are generally acceptable, unless a party can
establish that "there were a reasonable probability that the group's members would face
threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed."'24 8 In such a case, requiring
disclosure would run afoul of the First Amendment. 249
4. Public Financing
A final method of campaign finance regulation is public financing, whereby the
government itself provides funds to qualifying candidates. 250 The best-known example of
public financing is the Presidential Campaign Fund, 2 5 1 which "has raised millions of
252
dollars per presidential election cycle, and more than $1 billion since its inception."
Beyond the Presidential Campaign Fund, many states and localities have also implemented
253
their own forms of public financing.
244. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010) (describing disclosure requirements of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act).
245. See id. at 366 (explaining that while there is a burden there is "no ceiling on campaign-related activities"
and no restriction on who may speak).
246. Id.
247. See id. at 370 (addressing Citizens United's argument "that disclosure requirements can chill donations
to an organization by exposing donors to retaliation").
248. Id.
249. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 (explaining that a disclosure statute would "be unconstitutional as
applied" in such a case).
250. See TOKAJI, supra note 160, at 316-17 (introducing public financing).
251. See generally Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds, supra note 26, at 167 (providing a thorough
description of the Presidential Campaign Fund, which is funded through a "check-the-box" method on the federal
tax return).
252. Id.at 170. But cf Michael Luo & Jeff Zeleny, Reversing Stand, Obama Declines Public Financing,
N.Y. TtMES, June 20, 2008, at Al (reporting announcement by then-Senator Barack Obama that he would opt out
of the Presidential Campaign Fund, becoming the first major party candidate to do so).
253. See, e.g., Campaign Finance Reform Initiative, CITY OF BOULDER, https://bouldercolorado.gov/
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The primary goal of public financing is to reduce the need for candidates to solicit
private money to run their campaigns; thereby reducing the risk of corruption that monetary
contributions necessarily entail. 254 Most importantly for present purposes, however, is the
point that public financing, standing on its own, does not infringe on the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment. It is really just a question of whether the government
has the constitutional authority to spend money in this way, and the Supreme Court held in
Buckley that the government does indeed possess that power. 255 The Buckley Court further
clarified that the government may impose fair and reasonable conditions on those who
accept public financing and also may use its judgment to provide funds only to the most2 56
promising candidates.
Subsequent cases, including Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett,257 and Davis v. FEC,258 have struck down certain conditions as imposing an
unreasonable burden on the First Amendment rights of the candidates who accept public
financing and their supporters. The constitutional problem in those cases was that they
imposed a penalty on candidates that exuberantly exercised their First Amendment right to
spend money to inform and persuade voters. In the statute at issue in Arizona Free
Enterprise,for instance, if a campaign were to spend or raise more than her competitor, the
latter would receive a benefit in the form of cash contributions from the public financing
system. 259 But this link between public financing and benefiting a competitor is not
necessary to the basic concept of public financing. Standing alone-fairly designed and
administered-public financing remains on firm constitutional footing.
D. A Summary of the Buckley Framework
After forty years, the Buckley framework has become a firmly established component
of our constitutional law. 260 This well-developed body of doctrine provides a set of rules

elections/campaign-finance-reform-initiative (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) (describing a body of local campaign
finance regulation).
254. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976) (stating that "public financing as a means of eliminating
the improper influence of large private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest").
255. See id. at 90 (finding "no merit in [the] contention[]" that the Presidential Campaign Fund is somehow
beyond the power of Congress to enact).
256. Id. at 90-108.
257. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011) (finding a
matching fund provision unconstitutional).
258. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737, 744 (2008) (holding that certain aspects of the federal Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment).
259. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
260. See Hasen, supranote 190, at 585 ("The fountainhead of modem U.S. campaign finance jurisprudence
is the Supreme Court's opinion in Buckley v. Valeo."). But cf NEUBORNE, supranote 77, at 115 (suggesting that
First Amendment law is not "written in stone" but rather "in constant flux"). It must be noted that the Buckley
framework, particularly as applied in Citizens United, has attracted the ire of many commentators. See, e.g.,
NEUBORNE, supra note 77, at 117 (stating that "the Court got it dead wrong in Citizens United'); Stephen L.
Carter, HillaryClinton's Plan to Pack the Court, CHI. TRiB., May 29, 2015, at C17 (reporting an announcement
from "Democratic presidential front-runner Hillary Clinton ... that she would nominate to the [Supreme Court]
only individuals committed to overturning the 2010 decision in Citizens United .... ). But see, e.g., TRIBE &
MATZ, supra note 183, at 100, 111, 145 (expressing support for the Buckley framework and Citizens United);
TUSHNET, supra note 168, at 271-72 (same); but cf TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 183, at 96 ("Citizens United is
often deeply misunderstood."); TUSHNEr, supra note 168, at 247 ("Misunderstandings of Citizens United
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for analyzing political campaign finance regulation, one that is primarily designed to
prevent corruption while still giving a challenger a fair shot to unseat an incumbent. At its
most basic, the Buckley framework can be summarized as follows: Expenditure limits
generally violate the First Amendment, except to the extent that they impact only
foreigners. By contrast, most other types of campaign finance regulation are permissible,
including reasonable contribution limits, disclosure mandates (unless there is a probability
of harassment in a given instance) and public financing. 26 1 Now that the Buckley
framework has been laid out, the next Part presents the central claim of this Article, one
premised on a connection between the Buckley framework and the Blasius doctrine of
corporate law.
IV.

THE BLASIUS-BUCKLEYFRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION

An animating concern of the Buckley framework is the fear that incumbent
government officials might try to limit political campaign finance so as to hinder
challengers and entrench themselves in office. 262 The need to defend popular sovereignty
against this sort of behavior was dubbed the "republican rationale" above. 263 A parallel
concern over incumbent entrenchment is well known and much discussed in the corporate
context. 264 Concerns over an entrenched, self-perpetuating board of directors are at the
core of Unocal v. Mesa and other landmark corporate law cases, 265 as well as the subject
of much of the leading commentary on the field, including Berle & Means' and Jensen &
Meckling's foundational works. 266 With respect to corporate elections, it takes little
imagination to anticipate that an incumbent board could regulate the financing of corporate
elections for the nefarious purpose of hindering insurgent campaigns and perpetuating
themselves in office. Such behavior could obviously destroy the foundational principle of
shareholder sovereignty on which corporations are supposed to be governed.
In the political sphere, we apply the Buckley framework to prevent the government
from enacting campaign finance laws that interfere with the people's ability to assert their
sovereign power through democratic elections. 26 7 In the corporate context, what legal rule

abound.").
261. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARv. L. REV. 118, 125 (2010) (providing a
similar summary of the Buckley framework).
262. See supra Section lII.A (describing the republican underpinnings of the Buckley framework).
263. Supra text accompanying notes 173-92.
264. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor IncreasingShareholderPower, 118 HARv. L. REv. 833,
900 (2005) (referring to empirical findings that "firm value is negatively correlated" with board entrenchment);
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions As
Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473,473 (2003) (claiming that shareholders "reasonably might opt for board
entrenchment"); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of StaggeredBoards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 892 (2002) (observing that the law of corporate takeovers are
designed, in part, to prevent managers from "entrenching themselves").
265. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (applying enhanced scrutiny
to board actions taken to defend against a takeover because of "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily" to maintain its position of control).
266. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 45; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
267. See supra Part III (describing the Buckley framework).
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should we apply? There are no cases on point, in part because corporations have only just
begun to regulate corporate campaign finance in the past year or two. 2 6 8 It is thus an open
question and we must reason from first principles. This Part makes the claim that, when a
corporate board acts to regulate campaign finance, a reviewing court should employ a
corporate-law analog to the Buckley framework, and that this analog is the Blasius doctrine.
I call this the "Blasius-Buckley framework" and elaborate on this below.
A. The Blasius Doctrine
The so-called "Blasius doctrine" of corporate law is named after a well-known
Delaware Chancery Court decision decided in 1988.269 The doctrine is easily stated: If an
incumbent board of directors takes an action "for the primary purpose of impeding the
exercise of stockholder voting power," it does not receive the protection of the business
judgment rule, but rather "bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling
justification for such action." 270 Most importantly for present purposes, the Blasius
doctrine is directly and expressly aimed at maintaining a republican form of corporate
governance where shareholders hold the ultimate authority. 2 71 Indeed, Blasius itself is
famous for waxing poetic on republican theory, to the point that "the opinion's stirring
invocation of democratic principles often sends law students and other readers into a
272
patriotic rapture of sorts."
The most basic tenet of republican corporate governance is that the board is vested
with wide authority to manage the business but, if "the stockholders are displeased with
the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their
disposal to turn the board out."' 273 In the corporate world, as in the political one, however,
the incumbents can abuse their control over the 'machinery of democracy' to entrench
themselves in office and thereby undermine republican democracy. The Blasius doctrine,
like the Buckley framework, is designed to address precisely this recurring situation.
The goal of Blasius is to defend shareholder sovereignty against the inherent selfinterest of the incumbent board to retain their positions. Given the central importance of
the shareholder franchise to the republican form of corporate governance, the election
process must "be conducted with scrupulous fairness." 274 In order to have a legitimate
corporate democracy, "those in charge of the election machinery of a corporation must be
27 5
held to the highest standards in providing for and conducting corporate elections."
268. See infra Section V.B.1 (discussing the Wachtell Bylaw).
269. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
270. Id. at 661; City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 1 A.3d 281, 288 (Del. 2010)
(stating "a corporation's board must demonstrate a 'compelling justification' for board-adopted measures that
interfere with, or frustrate, a shareholder vote") (quoting Blasius, 564 U.S. at 661).
271. Infra note 308; see generally supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
272. Strine, supra note 31, at 267.
273. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,959 (Del. 1985); MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio,
Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (observing, "if the stockholders are not satisfied with the management or
actions of their elected representatives on the board of directors, the power of corporate democracy is available
to the stockholders to replace the incumbent directors when they stand for re-election"); see, e.g., Jacquie McNish,
Railroad Ups Ante for Deal, WALL STREET J., Dec. 17, 2015, at B3 ("If shareholders are not happy with [the]
stock price[,] 'I would throw out the board of directors at the next annual meeting."') (quoting William Ackman).
274. Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204,1206-07 (Del. Ch. 1987).
275. Id.; MMCos., 813 A.2d at 1126-27 ("The most fundamental principles of corporate governance are a
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Under the Blasius line of cases, if a board of directors attempts to utilize the "corporate
machinery.., for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office," that is not an ordinary
business decision but rather one that calls for heightened judicial scrutiny. 27 6 To take a
simple example, if an incumbent board of directors were to "cancel all elections in order
277
to retain power" forever, Blasius would apply and the incumbents would surely lose.
In Blasius itself, the Atlas Corporation was managed by a board of seven people, but
its certificate of incorporation authorized a board of up to 15.278 One of Atlas's
shareholders, Blasius Industries, sought the votes of its fellow shareholders through a
written solicitation of their consent. 279 Blasius asked its fellows to vote both to increase
the board to 15 people and to elect eight new directors nominated by Blasius, which would
put Blasius in control of the enlarged board. 2 80 The Atlas board of directors, believing in
good faith that the company would suffer under Blasius's control, quickly met and hatched
a plan to thwart Blasius. 2 8 1 The Atlas board enacted a bylaw expanding the board to nine,
and then appointed two (incumbent-friendly) directors to fill the new positions, 282 making
283
it mathematically impossible for the Atlas shareholders to elect the Blasius slate.
On these facts, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that, even though they acted in
good faith, the Atlas directors breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty by frustrating the
shareholders' power to elect a board of its choosing. 284 The court accordingly enjoined the
incumbent's plan. 285 In his opinion explaining the ruling, Vice Chancellor William Allen
expressly relied on the republican theory of the corporate form, writing, "The shareholder
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests." 286 As he further explained,

function of the allocation of power within a corporation between its stockholders and its board of directors. The
stockholders' power is the right to vote on specific matters, in particular, in an election of directors. The power
of managing the corporate enterprise is vested in the shareholders' duly elected board representatives....
Maintaining a proper balance in the allocation of power between the stockholders' right to elect directors and the
board of directors' right to manage the corporation is dependent upon the stockholders' unimpeded right to vote
effectively in an election of directors.... Accordingly, careful judicial scrutiny will be given a situation in which
the right to vote for the election of successor directors has been effectively frustrated and denied."); Paramount
Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) ("Because of the overriding importance of
voting rights, this Court and the Court of Chancery have consistently acted to protect stockholders from
unwarranted interference with such rights."). The federal government has likewise expressed its view of the
importance of the shareholder franchise through its enactment of the federal proxy rules. See J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (explaining that Congress enacted the proxy rules because it believed that "fair
corporate suffrage is an important right").
276. Schnell v. Cris-Craft Inds., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
277. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1 at 202 (2d ed. 2010).
278. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch. 1988).
279. Id. at 654-55; see id. at 664 ("Voting, or the granting of consent to stockholder action, is, of course, the
legal right of record holders of stock.").
280. Id. at 654.
281. See id. at 651 (stating "defendants here acted on their view of the corporation's interest and not
selfishly"); Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663 (noting "the action taken was taken in good faith").
282. Id. at 654-55.
283. Id. at 659.
284. See id. at 663 (concluding that the Atlas board's action "constituted an unintended violation of the duty
of loyalty that the board owed to the shareholders," even though it "was taken in good faith").
285. Id.
286. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
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[T]he stockholder vote... is critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of
power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that
they do not own. Thus, when viewed from a broad, institutional perspective, it
can be seen that matters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process
involve consideration not present in any other context .... [This is why, when
an incumbent board of directors acts] for the primary purpose of impeding the
exercise of stockholder voting power.., the board bears the heavy burden of
2 87
demonstrating a compelling justification for such action.
This standard of review that Blasius established has been described as "potent, '
289

' 290

288

"quite

' 29 1

Indeed, the standard is so high that its very
"strict,"
and "stringent."
onerous,"
application generally foreshadows that the defendants will lose. 292 But such a demanding
level of review is needed because there is good reason to fear that incumbent directors (like
incumbent politicians) 293 might abuse their control over the electoral process in order to
entrench themselves in power.
This concern over the self-interest of incumbents to retain power also explains why
the Blasius doctrine only applies to the acts of the board of directors; the doctrine places
no limits on other parties, such as the government. 294 The Blasius doctrine thus has nothing
to say about public laws and regulations that impact shareholder elections, like the federal
proxy rules or stock market listing requirements. 29 5 It is solely concerned with "unilateral"
action by an incumbent board of directors. 2 96 In other words, the Blasius standard of review
only applies to one specific situation, where "the primary purpose of the board's action is
to interfere with or impede exercise of the shareholder franchise and the shareholders are
not given a full and fair opportunity to vote" for directors. 2 97 In practice, boards of directors
commonly have many important reasons for their actions, making it difficult for plaintiffs
to establish that the board's "primary purpose" was to interfere with or impede the free
exercise of the shareholder franchise. 29 8 This predicate is thus "rarely" shown and
incumbent boards are only infrequently called upon to justify their behavior under the
299
Blasius test.
287. Id. at 659-61; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (stating the
law will not countenance subversion of corporate democracy by manipulation of corporate machinery).
288. Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013).
289. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996).
290. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 806 (Del. Ch. 2007):
291. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992).
292. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 323 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("In reality, invocation of the Blasius
standard of review usually signals that the court will invalidate the board action under examination. Failure to
invoke Blasius, conversely, typically indicates that the board action survived... "); accord Yucaipa Am. All.
Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, I A.3d 310, 335-36 (Del. Ch. 2010).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 173-92 (describing the republican rationale for the Buckley
framework).
294. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-60 (Del. Ch. 1988) (reviewing "a decision by the
boardto act for the primary purpose ofpreventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote .. ") (emphasis added).
295. See, e.g., infra note 439 (discussing newly proposed a NASDAQ rule).
296. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92.
297. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003).
298. See, e.g., Stroud, 606 A.2d at 91-92 (reversing the lower court decision because "it was error to apply
Blasius here").
299. MMCos., Inc., 813 A.2d at 1130.
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This is not to diminish the importance of the Blasius doctrine, however. To the
contrary, the doctrine and the republican conception on which it lies are of paramount
importance and remain pillars of contemporary corporate law. 300 The case itself has been
cited in hundreds ofjudicial opinions and thousands of times overall. 30 1 Furthermore, even
when Blasius does not directly apply, the courts take care to "infuse [their] analyses with
the spirit animating Blasius," and will "not hesitate to use [their] remedial powers where
30 2
an inequitable distortion of corporate democracy has occurred."
One issue that arises under Blasius is whether it applies with equal force to board
actions taken on a "clear day," as opposed to in the "heat of battle" in response to some
threat to the incumbents. The factual circumstances in which Blasius, Schnell, and other
related cases arose are generally of the latter sort, the heat of battle, leading some
commentators to suggest that actions taken on a clear day are more likely to survive Blasius
scrutiny. 30 3 Although this distinction finds some support in the case law, 30 4 the better view
seems to the contrary. In the sound opinion of one authority, Blasius should apply not only
when "the opposition is currently taking steps to exercise their shareholder franchise, but
[also when] management has taken steps that prevent such steps from even being
commenced. '30 5 Thus the fact that a corporate board acts "on a 'clear day' should not, in
306
and of itself, shield a board from Blasius scrutiny.
Finally, it is important to note that, under the Blasius doctrine, even if the directordefendants can show a compelling corporate interest for their action, they must also show
a reasonable "fit" between the means employed by the board and the compelling corporate
interest at stake. 30 7 This element, while not frequently mentioned in the law or
commentary, is inherent in the concept of "justification," the term used in Blasius, as for
one's acts to be justified, one must act proportionally. To take an example from criminal
law, one may well be justified in running red lights on the way to the hospital to deliver a
baby-but there is no such justification for running red lights on the way back. In the same
way, just because a board of directors has a very good reason to interfere with the
shareholder franchise, that doesn't mean that anything goes. Rather, the board's response
must be appropriate and proportionate to the goal it is intended to achieve.

300. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 323 (Del. Ch. 2000); see Strine,supranote 31, at 244 (noting
the central role of Blasius in Delaware corporate law); id. at 279 (noting the "enduring utility" of Blasius); id.at
290-91 (noting that Blasius maintained the credibility of Deleware law); id. at 290 n. 138 (noting that some critics
of Blasius turned into fans).
301. Westlaw KeyCite shows 1417 citing references as of March 14, 2016.
302. Chesapeake Corp., 771 A.2d at 323.
303. See, e.g., David C. McBride and Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics of
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 927,930 (2001) (discussing the types of cases to which Blasius
is applied); William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's ContinuingSuccess, 2009
U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 43 (citing McBride and Gibbs attempting to rationalize the Blasius line of cases).
304. Cf., e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) (noting that the present case
was distinguishable from a set of cases decided in other jurisdictions, "since here we have a defensive mechanism
adopted to ward off possible future advances and not a mechanism adopted in reaction to a specific threat").
305. JAMES D. Cox& THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 13.19 at 375 (3d ed. 2011).
306. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 303, at 43.
307. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 811, 819 (Del. Ch. 2007); cf Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (requiring that the board's actions be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed by a pending takeover bid).
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B. Blasius as an Analog to Buckley: The Blasius-Buckley Framework
I claim that the Blasius doctrine can and should be understood as an analogy to the
Buckley framework for issues of corporate campaign finance regulation. Blasius, like
Buckley, is specifically designed to defend a republican form of governance from the
danger that incumbents might use their power in order to frustrate actual or potential
challengers and thus perpetuate themselves in office. 30 8 Thus both Blasius and Buckley
apply a similar legal test to actions taken by incumbents that inhibit the ability of the
electorate to vote them out of office, and for a similar reason: Incumbents, whether
government officials or corporate directors, cannot be fully trusted to operate the
machinery of democracy due to their inherent self-interest in perpetuating themselves in
office.
This connection between Blaisus and Buckley is new to the literature, but it bears
noting that the link between the two lines of doctrine had been recognized by Chief Justice
Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court during his tenure as a lower-court judge. In one
case, Strine observed that Blasius "employed in the corporate context language that has
totemic meaning for those steeped in our legal tradition. The words 'compelling
justification' echo the almost impossible to satisfy standards used under the First...
Amendment[] to address restrictions on political speech." 30 9 In another, he wrote that once
the Blasius standard is invoked, a defendant board can "only justify their actions by
showing a compelling justification, a very high standard drawing on the closest scrutiny
used in cases ... restrictions on political speech." ' 3 10 While these offhand references do
not delve deeply into the connection between Blasius and Buckley, they do lend support to
my claim that Blasius calls for a Buckley-like analysis when an incumbent board regulates
the financing of dissident campaigns.
Now it is certainly true the analogy between corporate democracy and political
democracy is not a perfect fit. 3 11 One difference between the two is that political voters
have many different issues and interests in mind when they go to the polls, ranging from
taxes to education to gun control. Shareholders, by contrast, are generally thought to be
interested exclusively in their economic return. 3 12 Another distinction is that shareholders

308. See Strine, supra note 31, at 267 ("Blasius was rooted in analogies to republican democracy and
constitutional theory."); Paul H. Edelman et al., ShareholderVoting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism,87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2014) (describing Blasius as being premised on "a philosophical foundation of popular
sovereignty parallel to what we see in our polity," where "shareholders are the ultimate repository of corporate
authority, just as citizens are the font of power in the republic").
309. Mercier, 929 A.2d at 806 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)).
310. Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing United States v. Playboy
Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000)); see also Strine, supra note 31, at 243, 290 (explaining Blasius protects
shareholders against an incumbent board of directors "acting like a Latin American ruler in the latter part of the
last century, declaring an end to democracy in order to protect the people from the dangers that would arise if the
people erroneously ousted him at the upcoming election"). At least one constitutional scholar has also spotted this
connection. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, CorporateDemocracyfrom Say on Pay to Say on Politics, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 431, 434 (2015) ("Akin to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Delaware courts have been quite protective
of the ability of shareholders to vote for new directors.").
311. See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 9, at 1397-98 (warning that "corporations and political states are
marked by differences so fundamental that it is dangerous to extrapolate lessons from one realm to the other").
312. See Mercier, 929 A.2d at 819 ("Stockholders invest to make moolah, cash, ching, green, scratch,
cabbage, benjamins... money."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered ParticipatoryManagement: An
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can easily exit from the corporation, whereas political voters cannot so easily expatriate
themselves to another state or nation. 313 A third is that voting in the political arena has
expressive value separate and apart from its role in holding government officials
3 14
accountable.
Even accepting that the analogy is not perfect in every way, when it comes to the
inherent self-interest of those in power to remain there, corporate and political democracy
are indeed sufficiently analogous to make the connection between the Blasius doctrine and
the Buckley framework. One need not accept that corporate and political democracy are
alike in every way to conclude that they are alike in this one respect. Furthermore, one
powerful method of insulating oneself from electoral challenge is to limit the amount of
money a dissident campaign may collect or spend, and this is just as true in the corporate
context as it is in the political one.
Thus, corporate campaign finance regulations imposed by an incumbent board of
directors should be analyzed, in my view, by applying Blasius infused with the teachings
of Buckley. This "Blasius-Buckley framework" calls for courts to strictly scrutinize boardimposed campaign finance regulations to determine whether they advance a compelling
OrganizationalFailures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1067 (1998) ("Although investors have somewhat
different preferences on issues such as dividends and the like, they are generally united by a desire to maximize
share value."). This is a generalization and is clearly not entirely accurate, as evidenced by the precatory
shareholder proposals on social, ethical, or environmental issues presented every year, the hundreds of "socially
responsible" mutual funds that eschew tobacco, gambling, and certain other industries, and the consideration
shown by pension funds to employee interests, just to name a few. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not
United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in CorporatePolitical Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 55
(2009) (observing shareholders are "heterogeneous across multiple demographic categories and almost certainly
across the political spectrum"); Kent Greenfield, The Placeof Workers in CorporateLaw, 39 B.C. L. REv. 283,
305 n.92 (1998) ("The putative homogeneity of shareholder preferences may evaporate in any number of concrete
situations."). Furthermore, even solely within the economic domain, shareholders have different goals and
interests, such as the time horizon for their investment. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 65, at 10-12 (contrasting
"institutional investors" with a "myopic concern for short-term performance" with "end-user investors" who "do
not care about quarterly earnings or short-term gimmicks," but rather "want corporations to produce sustainable
wealth," for instance to fund retirement); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A
PragmaticReaction to the Dueling IdeologicalMythologists of CorporateLaw, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 456
(2014); Lipton, supra note 25, at 756 (criticizing as "erroneous" the idea that "the shareholder body is united by
a common interest in maximizing share value"); Jill E. Fisch, MeasuringEfficiency in CorporateLaw: The Role
of ShareholderPrimacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006) (stating shareholders "vary considerably among such
dimensions as the time frame over which they invest, the extent to which they trade versus passively holding the
corporation's stock, their degree of diversification, the extent to which they hold non-equity interests in the issuer,
any option or other hedging positions that they hold, and so forth"); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in
CorporateLaw, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 305 n.92 (1998) ("Some investors plan to hold their shares for the long term
and will be more interested in long-term returns; others will be looking for quick profits."); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, ParticipatoryManagement Within A Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 665 (1996) (explaining
"shareholder investment time lines are likely to vary from short-term speculation to long-term buy-and-hold
strategies, which in turn are likely to result in disagreements about corporate strategy"; also, "shareholders in
different tax brackets are likely to disagree about such matters as dividend policy, as are shareholders who
disagree about the merits of allowing management to invest the firm's free cash flow in new projects").
313. Rodrigues, supra note 9, at 1398 ("[S]hareholders have an important power that political voters lack:
the power of easy exit through the sale of their shares-that is, the power to leave their polity ... ").
314. First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("[S]ome have
considered ... the principal function of the First Amendment [to be] the use of communication as a means of
self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment.") (citing T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7 (1966); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
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corporate interest in a narrowly tailored fashion. 3 15 Section IV.C will examine which, if
any, corporate interests qualify as "compelling." Section IV.D will look at the various
methods of corporate campaign finance regulation to analyze the issue of narrow tailoring,
or fit.
C. CorporateInterests

This Section considers which corporate interests might qualify as "compelling" under
the Blasius-Buckley framework and thus may properly be the basis for regulating corporate
campaign finance. It takes the govemment interests considered in Section Il.B, above, and
analogizes each to the corporate arena.
1. Corruption

Corruption in politics, as discussed above in Section III.C. 1, occurs when elected
officials grant private benefits to certain favored parties rather than advance the interests
of the nation (or state, city, etc.) as a whole, like they are supposed to. This concept can be
analogized in the corporate context: Directors are elected to advance the corporate interest,
and yet a director may abuse her position to advance the interests of one shareholder or
some other constituency. Under this analogy, corruption in the corporate context occurs
when a director diverts or subverts the corporation in order to pursue some goal other than
the corporate interest.
And what is meant by "the corporate interest"? This question goes to the heart of
corporate law and the ultimate purpose of the corporation. Some argue "the corporate
interest" is a malleable concept that can be stretched to mean just about anything, from
workers' rights to the environment. 3 16 But important case law on the question, from Dodge
v. FordMotor Company3 17 in the early 20th century to eBay v. Newmark318 in the early
21st, makes clear that the corporate interest is not quite that broad under the law. Cases
such as these explain that "the corporate interest" is an interest in maximizing the pecuniary
3 19
value of the corporation over the long term for the benefit of the shareholders.
315. Recall that Blasius only applies to actions taken by the incumbent board. Supra notes 294-96.
316. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Historyfor CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
447 (2001) ("[T]he literature on corporate governance and corporate law has sometimes advocated 'stakeholder'
models as a normatively attractive alternative to a strongly shareholder-oriented view of the corporation. The
stakeholders involved may be employees, creditors, customers, merchants in a firm's local community, or even
broader interest groups such as beneficiaries of a well-preserved environment.").
317. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend
to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in
order to devote them to other purposes.").
318. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("The corporate form... is
not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested
in realizing a return on their investment .... Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, [corporate] directors are
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote
the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.").
319. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding that corporate law imposes a
legal duty on directors to "maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the providers
of equity capital, as warranted for an entity with perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their
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Surely it is possible for a director to be "corrupted" in the sense that she pursues some
goal other than to advance the corporate interest in long-term wealth maximization. At the
most base level, a director beholden to a specific shareholder (or some other party) may
seek to benefit that shareholder at the expense of the corporation. 320 This concern underlies
the longstanding prohibition on the "sale of office" by corporate directors. 32 1 Under this
doctrine, directors may not sell their posts for money (although they may stand aside at the
direction of a shareholder holding true voting control). 322 The law has long feared that
directors who accept side payments from one shareholder may be corrupted and thereby
act in favor of that shareholder, rather than the corporation and its shareholders as a body.
Beyond this simple type of corruption, a director who causes the company to act
purely philanthropically or to provide a community service, instead of maximizing longterm profitability, would also be "corrupt. ' 323 A corporate director with close ties to one
specific shareholder with a short investment horizon might try to divert the company away
from its proper, long-term focus in order to achieve that shareholder's short-term
investment goals. 324 Similarly, a director aligned with a non-shareholder constituency,
such as employees, customers, or bondholders, may seek to advance that constituency's

investment") (citing, inter alia, Schwartz, supra note 153, at 777-83); see Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015) (observing
that "the law of corporations in Delaware [holds that] directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end");
Schwartz, supra note 153, at 777 ("Among scholars, courts, and legislators, there exists a broad consensus that
the ultimate objective of the business corporation is 'long-run profitability and shareholder gain,' as opposed to
current profits, the betterment of humanity, or anything else."); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 cmt. f(1994) (stating "long-run profitability and shareholder gain are
at the core of the economic objective"); Letter from Laurence D. Fink, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock, Bus.
INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/larry-fink-letter-to-ceos-2015-4 ("[C]orporate leaders'
duty of care and loyalty is not to every investor or trader who owns their companies' shares at any moment in
time, but to the company and its long-term owners."). But see generally, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH (2010) (challenging the idea that corporations are legally obligated to maximize shareholder value).
320. See Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 720 ("[S]hareholders with special interests [could seek] to get one or
more representatives on the board" in order to "extract 'greenmail' benefits.").
321. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698,722
(1982) ("A sale of office is unlawful in every state .... ").
322. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).
323. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (distinguishing the permissible
"incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of the employds, like the building of a
hospital for their use," with an impermissible "general purpose and plan to benefit mankind"); eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 34 (holding that the "corporate form ... is not an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends"). Delaware and other states have recently adopted "benefit corporation" statutes that
specifically authorize the creation of legal entities with multiple purposes beyond shareholder wealth-creation.
See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 362(a) (2013) (defining a "public benefit corporation" as one that "shall be managed in a
manner that balances the stockholders' pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the
corporation's conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation").
324. Cf Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 111 (Del. Ch. 2011) (declining to enjoin the
target's defense on the basis of "evidence in the record that Airgas stockholders are so 'focused on the short-term'
that they would 'take a smaller harvest in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian Summer') (quoting
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)); id. at 111-12 (finding "sufficient evidence
that a majority of stockholders might be willing to tender their shares regardless of whether the price is adequate
or not," and that this constitutes "a clear 'risk' to the corporation).
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325
interests at the expense of the essential corporate goal of durable, long-term profitability.
In the recent Delaware case of In re Trados,326 for example, several directors of Trados
Inc. were also partners in a venture capital firm that held a substantial quantity of preferred
(but not common) stock in the company. This fact made them "dual fiduciaries" in that
they owed a duty of undivided loyalty to both the VC fund and to Trados and its common
shareholders. 327 Furthermore, because the preferred stock had a "liquidation preference"
in the event of a merger, the VC funds had "a divergent interest. . . that conflicted with the
interests of the common stock."'328 In other words, the VC-nominated directors on Trados's
board had a conflict of interest because they were obliged to act in the interests of the VC
fund standing behind them, and the fund's interests conflicted with those of the
32 9
corporation.
A final example would be where a director acts to advance a social or political goal at

the expense of the corporation's long-term financial prospects. 330 Imagine, a director
whose campaign was financed by an environmental activist, who is elected to the board of
a coal company and then tries to cause the company to shut down and destroy (not sell) the
company's facilities in order to combat climate change, even if those facilities are currently

profitable. 33 1 She would be a "corrupt" director in the sense that she is trying to advance a

325. Cf Tracie Woidtke, Public Pension Fund Activism and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis 3
MANHATTAN INST. (Sept. 2015), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr20.pdf ("Ownership by public
pension funds engaged in social-issue shareholder-proposal activism is negatively related to firm value."); John
G. Matsusaka et al., OpportunisticProposalsby Union Shareholders 1 (USC Ctr. For L. & Soc. Sci., No. CLASS
15-25, Oct. 7, 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract=2666064 ("The evidence suggests that some union proposals are
intended to influence collective bargaining outcomes rather than maximize shareholder value .... ); cf Ann
Lipton, Not Exactly About the Firm's Wealth Maximization, L. PROFESSOR BLOGs NETWORK (Mar. 21, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business-law/2015/03/not-exactly-about-the-firm.html ("I find it very hard to
believe that the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust is genuinely concerned about drug pricing in its capacity as
a shareholderseeking maximum retums. Instead, it seems far more likely that the Trust's concern is, you know,
drug prices. That it has to pay. For its beneficiaries. And it's using its status as shareholder of several
pharmaceutical companies to try to influence policy in that regard."). But cf E. Norman Veasey & Christine T.
Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can A DirectorServe? A Look at the Tensions Facing ConstituencyDirectors,
63 Bus. LAW. 761, 767 (2008) ("[C]ertain types of divergent interests that may at first appear to subject a
constituency director to a conflict between the interests of his sponsor and his duty to the corporation and all the
stockholders may not actually impose a conflict at all. A decision promoted by a labor representative on the board,
for example, might increase labor costs-and increased costs might be seen by some as antithetical to stockholder
interests in profits-but might nevertheless be in the company's long-term interests as promoting labor peace or
increased productivity.").
326. In re Trados, Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013); see also Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in
the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REv. 309, 345-48 (2013) (discussing the
2009 Trados unpublished opinion).
327. Trados, 73 A.3d at 46-47.
328. Id.at 47.
329. See Sepe, supranote 326, at 347 (reading Trados as taking the view that "being a board designee of a
particular constituency may be sufficient for a director to be incapable of exercising disinterested judgment").
330. See Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 720 (explaining "shareholders with special interests [could seek] to get
one or more representatives on the board" in order to "protect labor interests" or "advance a 'social' agenda").
331. Another example could be an anti-gun enthusiast elected to the board of a firearms company. Cf Trinity
Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 344 (3d Cir. 2015) (allowing corporation to exclude from its
proxy materials a proposed shareholder resolution calling on the board to review the company's sale of high
capacity firearms on the ground that the sale of such products "endangers public-safety and well-being").
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332
non-corporate cause rather than the corporate interest.
Just as in the political arena, the possibility that a director-candidate could be
corrupted through the financing of her campaign such that she acts against the corporate
interest is an important concern of all corporations. In other words, it is a compelling
corporate interest for purposes of the Blasius-Buckley framework. The prospect that a
director could be elected for the purpose of undermining the very corporation she is obliged
to support and advance is a deeply serious concern that could justify intra-corporate
regulation of the electoral process.

2. Outside Interference
The power to vote and elect corporate directors is vested exclusively in the
shareholders. 333 This is analogous to the political sphere, where only citizens are granted
the power to vote. 334 Even other stakeholders with abiding interests in the outcome of
domestic elections-such as those on work visas who pay American taxes or foreign
students attending American universities-are legally prohibited from voting in political
elections. 3 35 In the same vein, non-shareholder corporate stakeholders and constituencies,
including bondholders, employees, and customers, are likewise denied the right to vote in
corporate elections. In both the political and the corporate arenas, the vote is limited in this
way because decisions made by elected representatives are supposed to advance the interest
of the specified electorate-citizens or shareholders-rather than any other group or
336
constituency.
And this goes beyond voting itself As we saw in the political arena the government
has a compelling interest under Buckley in preventing foreigners from participating in any
' 337
activities that are "intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.
This is a "necessary consequence of the community's process of political selfeven one dollar (or
definition." 338 As such, foreigners have been banned from contributing
339
euro or peso) to a candidate for an American political office.
This interest applies with equal force in the corporate context. If non-shareholders
were permitted to participate in activities intimately related to shareholder voting, there

332. The term "corrupt" admittedly sounds odd in this context.
333. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 211 (b) (2009); see Strine, supra note 312, at 453 ("In American corporate law, only
"); Strine, supra note 319, at 766 ("In the corporate republic, no
stockholders get to elect directors ....
constituency other than stockholders is given any power.").
334. The right to political suffrage has greatly expanded over time to include women, African-Americans,
non-property holders and young adults. TOKAJI, supra note 160, at 13-32; see id. at 13 (collecting sources).
335. Id. at 30; see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1973) ("This Court has never held that aliens
have a constitutional right to vote .... Indeed, implicit in many of this Court's voting rights decisions is the
notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting such rights.").
336. See Strine, supra note 319, at 766 (suggesting that the right to vote being vested exclusively in the
shareholders is a "rather important signal of what the end of corporate law is in Delaware").
337. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Bemal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220
(1984)); see supra Section llI.B.2 (discussing the need to protect domestic election processes from outside
interference).
338. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (quoting Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982)). Cf
generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983) (describing a nation as an imagined
community defined by the constituents themselves).
339.

Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
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would be good reason to fear that directors elected through such a process might act against
the interest of the shareholders and in favor of the outsiders who helped get them elected.
Take the case of two rival companies, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi. It is easy to see that
Coca-Cola could stand to benefit by intermeddling in Pepsi's elections, for instance by
trying to get incompetent directors elected to Pepsi's board, and Pepsi clearly has a strong
and legitimate interest in preventing this outcome. In short, the prevention of improper
outside interference with corporate elections likely represents a compelling interest within
the meaning of the Blasius-Buckley framework.
3. Equality/Anti-Distortion
In the political sphere, many commentators have suggested a government interest in
equalizing electoral influence among voters. The intuition is that, just as each citizen gets
one vote, regardless of wealth,340 each citizen should likewise have roughly equal financial
power to influence the votes of others. 34 1 This purported government interest in equality
or anti-distortion has not, however, been found by the Supreme Court to be a compelling
one for purposes of the First Amendment and the Buckley framework. 342 Even so, it is
worth considering its salience in the corporate arena, as many commentators (as well as a
343
minority of the Supreme Court) believe this to be an important concern.
All that said, this equality rationale does not really apply to corporate elections, simply
344
because corporate democracy is not based on providing each shareholder one vote.
345
and it is
Rather, the general rule of corporate suffrage is that each share gets one vote,
perfectly acceptable for one person to gather up many shares and the voting power that
to be endowed super-voting
goes with them. 346 It is even allowable for one class of34shares
7
power where each share gets ten or one hundred votes.

340. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (stating "one person's vote must be counted equally
with those of all other voters").
341. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 204, at 1204 (arguing that the "Constitution of the United States should
contain a principle . . . that would guarantee to each eligible voter equal financial resources for purposes of
supporting or opposing any candidate").
342. Supra Section III.B.3.
343. Supra text accompanying notes 204-07.
344. This has been the case since the nineteenth century in the United States, although historical practices
have varied. It seems that in seventeenth century Britain as well as the antebellum period in the United States, for
instance, the default rule of corporate law was that "shareholders were treated like citizens, entitled to only one
vote each, no matter how much they invested." Collen A. Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: NineteenthCentury Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation 66, 73, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE
AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia, eds. 2004). But see id. (noting
that this default rule was "usually" overridden in practice in favor of one-vote-per-share).
345. DEL, CODE. tit. 8, § 212(a) (stating "each stockholder shall be entitled to I vote for each share ... held
by such stockholder," unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise); see also Dunlavy, supra note
344, at 82 (relaying that one-vote-per-share became "common" and "the norm" in the United States in the midto-late nineteenth century).
346. Notably, this is the foundation of the "market for corporate control." Henry G. Manne, Mergers andthe
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965) (coining the phrase and describing the
concept); see, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, CorporateLegacy, 5 HARv. BUS. L. REV. 237, 241 (2015) (explaining
how the market for corporate control can help align the interests of management and shareholders).
347. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 151(a) (empowering corporations to issue multiple "classes of stock," with
"such voting powers ... as shall be stated ... in the certificate of incorporation"); id. § 212(a) (addressing the
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This aggregation of voting power would be deeply troubling and clearly
unconstitutional in the political context. 3 4 8 In our political democracy, "[lI]egislators are
elected by voters, not ... economic interests." 34 9 But in our corporate democracy, directors
are indeed elected by economic interests. 3 50 So it is not a problem that one shareholder

holding many shares has much more say over an election than another shareholder holding
35
only a few shares.

1

All that being said, there may indeed be an equality or anti-distortion rationale that
does apply to corporate elections; one that arises from another important distinction
between political and corporate elections. In political elections, incumbent officials are
352
strictly prohibited from using the public treasury to finance their re-election campaigns.
But in corporate elections, incumbent directors are generally allowed to spend corporate
funds in support of their own re-election. 35 3 The upshot is that incumbent directors hold a
354
fundamental financial advantage over challengers that is not found in the political arena.
This is a structural difference between the two systems that may make anti-distortion a
more potent concern in corporate elections than it is in political ones.
In the end, however, the same reasoning that led the Supreme Court to reject equality
or anti-distortion as a compelling interest under Buckley likewise leads to its rejection under
the Blasius-Buckley framework. In the political arena, the First Amendment is "designed
to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources, and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas." 3 55 The same holds true under
situation where "the certificate of incorporation provides for more... than 1 vote for any share"); see, e.g., Zohar
Goshen & AssafHamdani, Corporate Control andIdiosyncraticVision, 125 YALE L.J. 560,563 (2016) (reporting
that "prominent technology firms that went public in recent years, including Google and Facebook, adopted the
controversial dual-class share structure in which the founders retain shares with superior voting rights").
348. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,562 (1964) ("It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State
could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of the State's voters could vote two, five,
or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only once."); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (explaining that "a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate
in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction").
349. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 ("Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.").
350. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 378-82 (discussing the issue of empty voting).
351. In fact, the one-share-one-vote rule is widely seen as beneficial. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Mariana
Pargendler, The Evolution ofShareholder Voting Rights: Separationof Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE
L.J. 948, 956 n.20 (2014) (observing that "[m]ost of the existing economic literature underscores the superior
incentives generated by the one-share-one-vote rule" and collecting authorities).
352. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8314 (making it "unlawful for any elected state or local officer... to use
... public resources for a campaign activity"); Colorado Common Cause v. Coffinan, 85 P.3d 551, 554 (Colo.
App. 2003) (observing that state law prohibits "officials from spending public funds to influence the outcome of
campaigns for political office" (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-117)).
353. See supra Section 11.B (discussing the financing of corporate campaigns).
354. This may be overstating the point. Incumbent politicians cannot directly use public funds to finance
their re-election campaign, but they may (and do) use public funds to generate publicity for the public works they
do, in part to influence voters to re-elect them to office. Examples of this behavior include press conferences,
official websites, listening tours, etc. And it shows results, as incumbents tend to be re-elected time and again.
See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273,
292 (1993) (reporting that "nearly nine out often [federal] incumbents seeking reelection win their races"); Lillian
V. Smith, Note, Recreating the "Ritual Carving": Why Congress Should Fund Independent Redistricting
Commissions andEnd Partisan Gerrymandering,80 BROOK. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (2015) (reporting that, in the
2014 federal election, "more than 94% of congressional incumbents who sought reelection held their seats").
355. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
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Blasius. It is important for an incumbent board to be allowed to spend corporate funds to
inform and attempt to persuade the shareholders of its merit, and the proper response by
challengers is to fight fire with fire. In other words, the proper response to speech is more
speech, not an attempt to level the playing field by suppressing or limiting one speaker or
another.
To summarize, the equity or anti-distortion concept does not hold much relevance in
corporate elections. Just as in the First Amendment context, where this idea has been held
to be a less-than-compelling interest under Buckley, it is likely to suffer the same fate in
the corporate context under the Blasius-Buckley framework.
4. More Competitive Elections
Most corporate elections for directors-even today in the supposed age of competitive
elections 356-are "ho-hum" and "dull affairs" whose "outcomes are predictable." 357 The
incumbent board commonly runs without any alternative slate of candidates competing
against them. Even when there is a contested election, incumbents often settle with the
challengers by accepting a short slate of insurgent directors rather than face the prospect of
an up-or-down vote on control of the company. 358 In response, many commentators have
suggested that corporations would benefit from electoral contests that are more
competitive. 3 59 Because the shareholder franchise is so vitally important to the essential
legitimacy of corporate governance, 3 60 these commentators advocate that corporate
more "meaningful" elections that make directors "truly
governance would benefit from
' 36 1
accountable to shareholders. "
Others disagree with the suggestion that we have too few truly contested corporate
elections. 362 They correctly point out that "the mere demonstration of a small absolute
number of contested elections demonstrates exactly nothing." 363 It is certainly possible
that the low number of proxy fights is a desirable state of affairs, given that incumbents by
definition have unique experience and knowledge about the corporation and that electoral
contests entail significant costs for the company, both in money and in directors' and
364
officers' time.
The lesson from the political arena is closest to the latter view. As we saw, the

356. Supra Section II.A.
357. Harris, ShareholderCampaignFunds, supra note 26, at 168-69.
358. Supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
359. See Higgins, supra note 76 ("The Securities and Exchange Commission should adopt measures to
empower shareholders in corporate elections and proxy proposals, according to Kara Stein, a Democratic
commissioner.").
360. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,659 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("The shareholder franchise is the
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.").
361. Bebchuk, supranote 26, at 676.
at 733; Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of ShareholderControl, 93 VA. L. REV.
362. See generally id.
789 (2007).
363. Lipton, supra note 25, at 740.
364. See id. ("The more reasonable presumption is that the low number of electoral fights reflects the simple
truths that the director nomination process works; that incumbent directors are far more often than not the best
people for the job; that freedom from frequent electoral contests permits directors to exercise their best business
judgment in the interests of the corporation as a whole; and that the costs of contested elections generally far
outweigh any hypothetical benefits.").
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Supreme Court has never accepted the idea that the simple desire to avoid landslide
victories by one candidate and to make political races closer is a "compelling interest"
within the meaning of the Buckley framework and the First Amendment. 365 It is up to the
voters to decide whom to elect, and if they strongly prefer one candidate, there is no reason
to prop up a challenger, even if the populace's preference is partly a result of the campaign
spending of the winner.
The same outcome would seem to apply under the Blasius-Buckley framework. The
corporation has an interest in having diligent and effective directors, and it clearly has an
interest in recruiting such people to join the board. It may even have an interest in
encouraging challenges from capable outsiders with a different, yet valid, view of
appropriate corporate policy. But it is hard to see why the corporation has a compelling
interest in fostering competitive elections simply for their own sake. That would seem
nothing short of wasteful, especially given the high price-both in money and time--of
366
running a modem corporate campaign.
5. Reduce Cost of Campaigns
As with political elections, corporate elections can be quite expensive. A proxy
contest can cost hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars. 367 An argument can
be made that this high level of spending is a problem in and of itself because incumbent
campaigns are funded out of the corporate treasury; if the campaigns are expensive, this
acts as a drain on corporate resources. Furthermore, because insurgent campaigns must pay
their own costs, while any benefit they yield redounds to the corporation and its
shareholders as a whole, the high cost of corporate campaigns can lead to a "free-rider"
problem where even worthwhile insurgent campaigns will not be launched. 368 Finally, the
magnitude of these problems is a direct function of the cost of corporate election
campaigns: The more expensive they are, the worse the problems get.
Moreover, these out-of-pocket costs, as impressive as they are, may be dwarfed by
the time-cost of distracting executives from focusing on managing the company. Thanks
to prior exercises in shareholder activism, there is a clear trend toward annual elections of
all directors (as opposed to staggered elections, as in the Senate). 369 If corporate elections
continue to increase in number and competitiveness, as they appear to be doing, 3 70 the
result will be a never-ending election cycle that could easily chew up large quantities of
directors' and executives' time. And because "time is money," this sort of distraction could
impose a significant economic toll on public companies.
In the public sphere, the goal of reducing the cost of campaigns has not been found to
be a compelling government interest under Buckley, but it may have more purchase in the
365. Supra Section III.B.4.
366. See supra note 86 (reporting that it costs millions of dollars to min a proxy contest at a public company).
367. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing high costs of proxy contests).
368. See Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 689-90 ("The issue of costs is especially difficult because of the
existence of a 'free-rider' problem."). Thus, one pillar of corporate election reform is a desire to reduce the costs
of mounting an insurgent campaign. See, e.g., Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to Securities and
Exchange Commission, Mar. 5, 2015, at 6-7 (advocating for "universal proxies" on the theory that they would
lower costs).
369. Schwartz, supra note 346, at 249.
370. See supra Section ll.A (describing the current rising trend of competitive corporate elections).
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corporate arena under the Blasius-Buckley framework. Most importantly, the distractions
caused by constant campaigning are more troublesome for corporate officials than for
government officials. 37 1 In a corporation, the primary directive for the board is to manage
the business and affairs of the company; keeping in touch with the shareholders is
secondary. For a government official, by contrast, interacting regularly with the voters is
an important part of the job, and so a perpetual campaign is not necessarily inconsistent
with this aspect of politics.
On the other hand, the fact remains that speech costs money. Blasius, like the First
Amendment and Buckley, is concerned with the freedom of shareholders to exercise their
franchise in light of all the information and debate they need. Any limit on the cost of
campaigns will necessarily result in less information going out to shareholders as they
decide how to cast their ballot. While some might suggest that a limit of, say, four letters
to shareholders would provide them with "enough" information, it is surely the case that
some shareholders would only be persuaded by a fifth letter.
In the end, it is a close call whether an interest in lowering campaign costs and
minimizing the time spent campaigning would qualify as a compelling interest under the
Blasius-Buckley framework that would provide a board with justification for imposing
limits on corporate campaign finance.
D. Methods of Regulation
The prior Section concluded that there are two, and possibly three, compelling
corporate interests in regulating campaign finance in corporate elections: corruption,
outside interference, and (perhaps) reducing the cost of campaigns. This Section focuses
on the other portion of the Blasius-Buckley framework-reasonable fit or narrowly
tailoring. It explores potential intra-corporate methods (e.g., bylaws) for advancing those
corporate interests that fall within the boundaries of acceptable corporate action under the
Blasius-Buckley framework.
1. ContributionLimits
One type of corporate campaign finance regulation would be a contribution limit that
restricts the amount of money that may be given to a director-candidate or her campaign.
Most such regulations are generally permissible under the Blasius-Buckley framework, just
as they are under Buckley, because contribution limits impose only a "marginal
restriction" 372 on the shareholder franchise. A contribution limit does not prevent any
shareholder from voting, nor would it impose any additional cost on voting. Nor does a
contribution limit prevent any shareholder from speaking out on individual candidates or
issues in the campaign. This is all closely related to the Buckley framework, which holds
that contribution limits do not strike directly at the core of the First Amendment because

371. Cf Leo E. Strine, Jr., Towards a True CorporateRepublic: A TraditionalistResponse to Bebchuck's
SolutionforImproving CorporateAmerica, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1777(2006) ("The director election process
•..must be designed with efficiency in mind, lest it destroy more value than it protects.").
372. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,20-21 (1976) ("By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for
political expression," a contribution limit "entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to
engage in free communication.").
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373
they do not directly limit speech.
Moreover, contribution limits respond to the compelling corporate interests in
preventing corruption and outsider meddling. As in the political context, large campaign
contributions to director candidates clearly raise the specter of corruption (in the sense of
subversion of the corporate interest in economic success over the long term). 374 There is
good reason to fear a director candidate who receives a substantial sum from one
shareholder may be inclined to act in a way that will benefit that shareholder, perhaps at
the expense of the corporate interest. Similarly, a director candidate that receives large
contributions from someone with a social or political goal may try to make the corporation
advance that goal, which is another form of corruption. Finally, if a director candidate
receives a contribution from an outsider-someone not a member of the shareholder
electorate-there is good reason to fear that the director may be influenced by that outsider
to pursue a course that benefits her.
Beyond corruption, there is also the problem of outside interference. On this point, it
would almost certainly satisfy the Blasius-Buckley framework for a corporation to regulate
intra-corporate campaign finance such that only shareholders-and no other
constituencies-may make campaign contributions to director-candidates. Recall that
Blasius is concerned with the voting rights of shareholders and has nothing to say about
the interests of other non-voting constituencies. Thus the doctrine would almost certainly
countenance a corporate policy that disempowers other groups, whether internal to the
corporation, such as bondholders or employees, or external to the corporation, such as
advocacy groups (e.g., the National Rifle Association or the Sierra Club).
But even a corporate policy that barred non-shareholders from making campaign
contributions may not go far enough to prevent meddling by outsiders. In contrast to
political elections, where it takes significant time and commitment to become a citizen, and
where people can generally only be citizens of one country at a time, it is extremely quick
and easy to become a shareholder (just call a broker and buy a share), and one may be a
shareholder in an unlimited number of companies at the same time. So it may also satisfy
the Blasius-Buckley framework-although this a closer question-for a corporation to
further limit contributions such that only large or longstanding shareholders may contribute
to director candidates. Proxy access bylaws provide a template for such a rule-3% for 3
375
years, for instance.
This may be too tight a stricture, however, as small shareholders are shareholders too;
Blasius protects the franchise rights of all shareholders, great and small. A corporation that
tried to prevent small or recent shareholders from contributing to director campaigns could
well violate the Blasius-Buckley framework, just as a statute that tried to prevent recently
naturalized citizens from contributing to political campaigns would likely run afoul of
Buckley. 376 Yet the situations are not identical because it is so easy to become a shareholder

373. Supra Section 11I.C.1.
374. See supra Section IV.C. 1 (discussing the concept of corruption of a corporation in terms of subverting
its core function).
375. Supra text accompanying notes 71-75. Cf Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Casefor FavoringLong-Term
Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1554 (2015) (challenging the idea that long-term shareholders should be
favored over short-term shareholders).
376. Cf Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny and invalidating a state's
limitation of the right to vote to those resident in the state for at least one year).
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and so hard to become a citizen. In other words, all citizens can be presumed to have a
strong commitment to the nation, 377 whereas the same cannot be said about all
shareholders. And in light of the concerns over corruption and outside interference, a
corporation that only allows longstanding shareholders (of any size) to contribute to
director candidates may be acting appropriately and within the legal limits set by the
Blasius-Buckley framework. Such a corporation would prevent the problem of outsiders
transforming themselves into shareholders overnight by buying a few shares, while still
allowing small holders to participate in the electoral process.
Finally, contribution limits present the issue of "empty voting" and related
behavior. 378 As Henry Hu and Bernard Black have explained, through the purchase and
sale of financial derivatives, a shareholder can alter her financial relationship to the
company while still retaining the right to vote her shares. 379 For instance, through the use
of an "equity swap," a shareholder can completely hedge her financial stake in the
company, leaving her with no economic interest but retaining the right to vote. 380 At the
extreme, a shareholder can even put herself in a "net negative" economic position vis-a-vis
the company. 3 81 The latter type of shareholder would have an incentive to use her voting
power to harm the company and drive its share price lower. 3 82 A board of directors would
be on solid ground to address this perverse voting incentive. It would almost certainly be
acceptable under the Blasius-Buckley framework for a corporation to prohibit or limit
campaign expenditures by shareholders with zero, or negative, financial interest in the
383
company.
2. Expenditure Limits
An expenditure limit would place a ceiling on the amount that may be spent on
corporate elections. An expenditure limit could be applied to the candidate herself, as well
as those connected with her. It could also be applied to independent expenditures made by
parties neither connected to nor coordinating with the candidate. As in the First
Amendment context, 384 expenditure limits are much more problematic than contribution
limits under the Blasius-Buckley framework for corporate campaign finance regulation.

377. New citizens are obliged to renounce allegiance to other sovereigns and swear allegiance to the United
States. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 70 Stat. 911 § 337(a) (1965).
378. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 811, 812 (2006) (articulating the phenomenon where shareholders own more votes
than economic ownership in a company).
379. Id.; see also Lipton, supra note 25, at 756-57 (expressing concern over "short-term, highly hedged
investors such as hedge funds [who] increasingly acquire corporate electoral power far beyond their economic
interests").
380. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2011)
(describing "cash-settled total-return equity swaps").
381. See Hu & Black, supra note 378, at 812 ("In an extreme situation, a vote holder can have a negative
economic interest and, thus, an incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company's share price.").
382. See id. at 816 (giving the example of the Perry Corp. hedge fund's large investment in Mylan
Laboratories; because the hedge fund had fully hedged its Mylan shares, but not the shares it held in a merger
partner, it had a direct financial interest in having Mylan overpay in the deal).
383. Cf id.at 850-51 (referring to Blasius and observing that the decoupling of economic interest and voting
rights "strikes directly at both the economic and legal logic behind shareholder voting rights").
384. Supra Section III.C.2.
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Consider first a limit on tLe amount a candidate herself (or her campaign) may spend.
First, the compelling corporate interest in preventing corruption is inapposite here, as a
director-candidate cannot, by definition, corrupt herself. Furthermore, any such limit would
probably violate the Blasius-Buckley framework because it would directly impede the
ability of a director-candidate-who is very likely a shareholder herself-to communicate
with shareholders and ask for their vote. This is an affront to the core concern of Blasius
that shareholders be free to exercise their franchise without interference by the corporation.
Analysis of the other compelling corporate interest-prevention of outside
interference-is more subtle, at least in the situation where the director-candidate appears
to represent a non-shareholder constituent. Consider the case where a major bondholder or
union leader runs for election to the board of directors. In such a case the corporation might
have a valid rationale for preventing that outsider from using her seat on the board to
primarily advance the interests of bondholders or employees and could therefore have a
legitimate reason for capping the amount she can spend on her own campaign. This concern
is real, but the medicine is probably worse than the disease. Shareholders, under the logic
and holding of Blasius, must be given ample room to decide who they want to elect to the
board, even if the incumbents believe in good faith that a certain director would be a
disaster for the company and the shareholders. 3 85 Outsiders seeking election to the boardincluding bondholder and employee representatives-should almost certainly be allowed
to spend her own money to take their message to the shareholders, who are sovereign over
the corporate republic, after all.
Now consider spending limits placed not on candidates or campaigns, but rather on
independent third parties spending their own money without coordinating with any
director-candidate. In such a case, there is no valid concern over corruption because such
independent expenditures are, by hypothesis, not made with any prearrangement or
coordination with the candidate. (Of course, expenditures that are purportedly independent,
but in fact are coordinated, would be treated as contributions, as in the political arena. 386)
Thus under Blasius-Buckley, just as in the political context, 3 87 independent expenditures
relating to director elections probably cannot be limited by the incumbent board.
Finally, the board of directors may seek to limit spending in order to prevent outside
interference, a compelling corporate interest. 388 It is conceivable that an outsider with a
divergent agenda-for instance an anti-gun activist at Smith & Wesson-might take it
upon itself to encourage shareholders to vote for or against a given candidate. This may
cause problems at the company and impose costs on both the company and the
shareholders, and the corporation likely has a compelling interest in avoiding such costs
and distractions. On the other hand, the shareholders making the choice can benefit from
the additional information and perspective, meaning that any restriction on independent
expenditures would go the heart of Blasius-Buckley. Shareholder advisory services, such

385. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting Blasius rule applies
when the incumbent board impedes the shareholder franchise "because they held a good faith belief that such
shareholder action would be self-injurious and shareholders needed to be protected from their own judgment").
386. Cf Liz Hoffman et al., SEC Probes Activist Hedge Funds, WALL STREET J., June 5, 2015, at C3 ("The
Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether some activist investors teamed up to target
companies without disclosing their alliances, potentially in violation of federal securities rules ... .
387. See supranote 240 (describing the "SuperPAC").
388. Supra Section IV.C.2.
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as ISS and Glass Lewis, regularly engage in this type of activity, and their expert and repeat
389
participation adds an important perspective to the conversation among shareholders.
Similarly, unions, environmental activists, and others should almost certainly be permitted
to make independent expenditures in favor or against a director. Their views add to the
debate over corporate elections and thus directly benefit the shareholders whose franchise
rights are protected by Blasius. Hence, despite the legitimate concerns over outside
interference, if a corporation were to restrict independent expenditures by outsiders relating
to a corporate election, it would present a close question under the Blasius-Buckley
framework. The answer would require a careful analysis of how much election-related
speech would be silenced by the board's action, as well as how valuable that speech would
be to the voting shareholders. A nuisance campaign could probably be quieted, but an
outsider with a legitimate grievance would likely have to be given the chance to air it.
In conclusion, independent expenditures relating to corporate elections likely cannot
be limited in any way without running afoul of the Blasius-Buckley framework. 3 90 Just as
in the political arena under Buckley, shareholders must to be free to speak to one another,
and hear from those inside and outside the company, in order to knowledgably participate
in board elections. Even in a case where a director-candidate has interests that conflict with
those of the shareholders (a bondholder, for instance), it would likely violate the BlasiusBuckley framework for the incumbent board to stop her from communicating with the
shareholders and trying to win their votes. The Blasius-Buckley framework emphasizes the
free-flow of information for voting shareholders. Just as the government is generally not
allowed to limit the number or type of messages the citizenry may to send and receive, so
too the corporate board generally does not have the power to muzzle those who want to
spend money to influence corporate elections.
3. Disclosure
A disclosure-based regulation of corporate campaign finance would require that
shareholders receive notice of campaign contributions and campaign-related expenditures.
In political campaign finance, this type of regulation is almost always permissible under
the First Amendment. The same likely holds true in the corporate domain under the
Blasius-Buckley framework.
Disclosure can effectively respond to corruption and outsider interference, two
compelling corporate interests. As for corruption, disclosure of the identity of the funders
of a director's campaign can reduce the risk of corruption by bringing such payments to
the light of day. Disclosure can also minimize or avoid interference by outsiders in the
same way. Furthermore, additional information that disclosure provides can enhance the
ability of shareholders to make thoughtful decisions about which directors to elect, and any
infringement on the shareholder franchise by disclosure rules is minimal. 39 1 Consider
again the hypothetical case where one company might try to sabotage a corporate election
at its rival: Pepsi's board would be well within its powers if it required Coke, in its

389. These companies even solicit public comment on their proposals, thus creating a useful arena for debate.
390. Exceptions might be made on an individualized basis. For example, a company who is suffering true
libel, harassment, or similar harms due to someone's participation in corporate democracy would presumably
have the power to act to restrain that individual-including through court order.
391. Disclosure-based regulations have long been a core component of the federal proxy rules.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 41:4

independent spending relating to Pepsi board elections, to disclose who is funding the
advertisements, mailings, etc. Pepsi shareholders would rightfully take Coke's advice with
'a grain of salt,' and they might even discount it entirely or hold it against the candidate.
(Of course, knowing this in advance, Coke may decide against interfering in Pepsi's
election process in the first place.)
In the political arena, campaign finance laws requiring disclosure generally survive
review under the Buckley framework. 392 There is, however, an important exception
allowed for specific cases where disclosure could lead to threats, harassment, or reprisals.
In such cases, there is a legitimate concern that disclosure requirements could chill the free
exchange of ideas relating to democratic elections. For that reason a rule requiring
3 93
disclosure may be denied effect under Buckley in a given case.
Should this exception be extended to the corporate context? There are good arguments
on both sides. It is true that disclosure requirements might chill some speech regarding
corporate elections. But that is less problematic in the corporate arena than the political
one, for several reasons. First, the essential goal of Blasius is to protect the shareholder
franchise, whereas the Buckley framework also recognizes that speech has a personal,
expressive quality unrelated to its effectiveness. 394 For this reason, the chilling of speech
in a corporate election is not as harmful as it would be in a political one. Second, it is so
vitally important that the shareholders receive accurate information, including knowledge
of who is backing whom in a proxy contest, that the need for a disclosure rule probably
overrides the concern that some speakers may be chilled. As in the Coke and Pepsi
hypothetical above, a disclosure requirement may effectively force Coke into remaining
silent regarding Pepsi's election process. But that is not a bad outcome, since the goal of
Blasius is to protect the Pepsi shareholders, not to enable Coke in its self-expression.
In sum, board-imposed disclosure-based regulation of corporate campaign finance
would be generally permissible under the Blasius-Buckley framework, just as it is under
Buckley. 395 That said, a situation could conceivable arise where a disclosure rule would go
so far as to chill a lot of important voting-related speech, in which case it might violate the
Blasius-Buckley framework, at least in that specific instance.
4. CorporateFinancing
Corporate financing of dissident campaigns for seats on the board-analogous to
'public financing' of political campaigns-is the one area of corporate campaign finance
that has received some attention in the academic literature. 396 In public financing, the
government provides funding for candidates; by analogy, the corporation itself could
provide funding for insurgent slates. Numerous scholars, including Lucian Bebchuk, have
advocated a policy whereby unsuccessful challengers in board elections-those who lose
the election-be at least partially reimbursed by the corporation, generally on the condition
that they achieved a certain minimum level of support. 39 7 Most recently, Professor Lee

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Supra Section III.C.3.
See supra text accompanying notes 247-49 (discussing this exception to the general rule).
See supra note 314 (providing an overview of the self-expression aspects of the First Amendment).
Supra Section III.C.3.
See supra Section HI.C.4 (referring to this literature).
Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 699; see also Emerson & Latcham, supranote 8, at 435-36 (describing a
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Harris published a similar proposal, modeled directly from the Presidential Campaign Fund
39 8

discussed in Section III.C.4.

Pursuant to the Blasius-Buckley framework, corporate financing of insurgent proxy
campaigns seems harmless and even potentially meritorious, depending on how it were
structured. It would almost certainly pass muster under that legal rule, as it would appear
to only enhance shareholders' ability to exercise their vote in an informed manner. 399 This
40 0
is akin to Buckley's handling of the issue in the political sphere.
V. THE BLASIUS-BUCKLEYFRAMEWORK APPLIED TO GOLDEN LEASH REGULATION
Part IV introduced and explained the Blasius-Buckley framework for judicial review
of board-imposed corporate campaign finance regulations. To further illustrate the
proposed doctrine and how it works, this Part applies the Blasius-Buckley framework to
the important example of anti-golden leash bylaws. 40 1 Recall that the golden leash,
described in detail in Section lI.C above, is a new and powerful method of financing
corporate elections. Since its introduction in 2013 by several activist hedge funds, it has
been both praised and criticized by corporate law commentators and practitioners. 40 2 One
of the strongest critics, the law firm Wachtell Lipton, published a model corporate bylaw
that would largely outlaw the golden leash entirely (the "Wachtell Bylaw"). 403 The boards
of dozens of public companies adopted that bylaw, although almost all have since retracted
it. 404 In addition to the Wachtell Bylaw, others could be imagined that limit or regulate the
golden leash in any number of ways. How should corporate law respond to such boardimposed bylaws?
This Part contends that, because the golden leash can be understood as a method of
financing corporate elections, 40 5 anti-golden leash bylaws can similarly be understood as
corporate campaign finance regulations imposed by an incumbent board of directors. As
such, their legal validity can and should be tested using the Blasius-Buckley framework
developed in Part IV above. 40 6 This Part undertakes that analysis, thereby providing a
system of "proportional reimbursement"); Friedman, supra note 85, at 959-64 ("[l]n deciding a[n unsuccessful]
minority stockholder's fight to reimbursement[, h]is claim against the corporate treasury could be conditioned on
his proposal's or candidate's obtaining a specified percentage of the shares voting thereon-perhaps ten or fifteen
percent.").
398. Harris, ShareholderCampaign Funds, supra note 26, at 169.
399. See Friedman, supranote 85, at 958 ("[Ult seems apparent that a full and fair presentation of the issues
in a contested corporate election cannot be made if the stockholders are given only one side of the picture....
Accordingly, the very reason that originally moved the courts to authorize management expenditures-the need
for informing the stockholders-further requires that minority stockholders be accorded similar rights.").
400. Supra Section III.C.4.
401. See supra Section I.C (describing the golden leash).
402. See-generally Nili, supranote 117, at 512 (defending the golden leash against "the hysteria over these
payments").
403. Martin Lipton et al., Bylaw Protection Against Dissident Director Conflict/Enrichment Schemes,
COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (May 9, 2013), http://clsbluesky.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/shareholderactivism-update-bylaw-protection-against-dissident-director-conflict-enrichment-schemes-I.pdf
(proffering a
model bylaw to prohibit the golden leash).
404. See Cain et al., supra note 20, at 652-54, 671-78 (recounting the history of the Wachtell Bylaw).
405. See supraSection I.C (discussing the function and purpose of the golden leash).
406. Other commentators have suggested that golden leash regulation should be tested under the Blasius
doctrine. Prestidge, supranote 109, at 318 (citing Blasius);Brandon S. Gold, Why the WachtellBylaw on Director
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demonstration of the Blasius-Buckley framework in action. Section V.A, building on the
discussion above in Section II.C, will address whether a corporation has a compelling
interest in regulating the golden leash, rather easily concluding that it does. Section V.B
will then discuss the question of narrow tailoring. As will appear, I conclude that boards of
directors have substantial authority under the Blasius-Buckley framework to regulate or
limit the golden leash, but probably cannot prohibit the practice entirely. In other words,
while the original Wachtell Bylaw might run afoul of the Blasius-Buckley framework, a
modified version could easily pass muster.
A. CorporateInterests in Regulating the Golden Leash
The first component of the Blasius-Buckley framework would ask whether there exist
compelling corporate interests in regulating the golden leash, and the answer is almost
certainly yes. As discussed above in Section II.C, the golden leash poses a direct threat to
the foundational corporate interest in having a board of directors whose loyalty
unquestionably lies with the corporation and its shareholders. When one party makes large
payments directly to a director-candidate, as in the golden leash, this clearly raises the
specter that the candidate will follow the donor's commands (or hints or suggestions), even
if doing so may not be in the best long-term interest of the corporation or its shareholders
as a whole. 407 A corporation surely has a compelling interest in preventing this sort of
corruption, diversion, and subversion. 40 8 On the other hand, the golden leash does have its
benefits, most notably in that it helps recruit excellent directors. 40 9 Even so, a reasonable
board of directors could conclude that the golden leash poses a serious threat to the
corporation and its long-term success-or at least that the likely harms outweigh the likely
benefits. In short, an incumbent board likely would have "compelling" corporate
justifications to regulate the golden leash.
B. Methods of Regulating the Golden Leash
Under the Blasius-Buckley framework, a "compelling corporate interest" is only the
first hurdle. 4 10 Beyond this threshold inquiry, any board-imposed regulation of campaign
finance, such as the golden leash, must also be "narrowly tailored" to protect that corporate
that the golden leash presents a clear threat of
interest. 4 11 Given
corruption/subversion/diversion, as discussed above in Section II.C, what types of boardimposed bylaws might be narrowly tailored to address this danger? This Section contends
that the original Wachtell Bylaw may have been insufficiently narrowly tailored, but that
Compensation by Shareholdersis Overbroadand May FailBlasius Scrutiny, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG,
(May 31, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/05/31/why-the-wachtell-bylaw-on-director-com
pensation-by-shareholders-is-overbroad-and-may-fail-blasius-scrutiny/ (applying Blasius to board response to
the threat of the golden leash). Wachtell Lipton itself, however, appears to be of the opinion that its bylaw should
be tested by the business judgment rule. See Lipton et al., supranote 403 ("Adoption of such a bylaw should be
a simple matter of the board's business judgment.").
407. Supra Section I.C.
408. Supra notes 320-32.
409. See, e.g., supra note 105 (discussing one of Jana's director-nominees, a former Canadian Minster of
Agriculture).
410. See supra Section IV.B (describing the Blasius-Buckley framework).
411. Supra Section IV.A-B.

2016]

FinancingCorporateElections

modestly modified versions of the Wachtell Bylaw would likely be proper.
1. The Wachtell Bylaw
In May 2013, Wachtell Lipton released a model bylaw that "would disqualify
candidates that are party to [a golden leash agreement] from serving as directors." 4 12 The
"Wachtell Bylaw," as this model has come to be known, 4 13 simply banned the golden leash
entirely. 4 14 Acting on Wachtell Lipton's recommendation, the boards of directors of
4 15
several dozen public companies adopted the Wachtell Bylaw through board action.
Within months, however, the influential proxy advisory firm, ISS, came out against
4 16
the Wachtell Bylaw, saying it would recommend voting against directors that adopted it.
According to ISS, the problem with the Wachtell Bylaw is that it may interfere with the
proper functioning of republican corporate governance: "The adoption of [the Wachtell
Bylaw] without shareholder approval may be considered a material failure of governance
because the ability to elect directors is a fundamental shareholder right. Bylaws that
preclude shareholders from voting on otherwise qualified candidates unnecessarily infringe
on this core franchise right."'4 17 In response to ISS's threat-which it acted on in at least
one case 4 18-nearly all the companies that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw abandoned it,
on the theory that discretion is the better part of valor. 4 19 Yet the Wachtell Bylaw remains
in place in a few companies and may be renewed in the future by others. And at some point,
an activist shareholder may challenge it in court, thus making it worth analyzing under the
Blasius-Buckley framework.
The analysis must begin from the recognition that the golden leash can provide at least
one significant benefit to the corporation, namely as an aid in recruiting excellent people
to serve on the board of directors who might not otherwise be interested or considered. 420
Furthermore, the fact that golden leash payments may be quite large, and may only be paid
over to certain directors and not others, are not necessarily problematic. In many lines of
412. Lipton et al., supranote 403.
413. Cain et al., supra note 20, at 652; Prestidge, supra note 109, at 333.
414. This is a bit of an overstatement, or at least may depend on a more precise definition of "golden leash"
than provided in this Article, as the Wachtell Bylaw would apparently not bar relatively modest "customary
compensation" payments to directors "for being willing to stand for election." David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin,
Debating Activists Paying Directors, WALL STREET J., Nov. 26, 2013, at C1 (noting that such "customary"
payments are a "common" practice); see Lipton et al., supranote 403 (proffering the Wachtell Bylaw). For present
purposes, however, this Article makes the simplifying assumption that the Wachtell Bylaw would prohibit any
and all golden leash payments.
415. Cain et al., supra note 20, at 652-53, 672 (reporting that thirty-two companies adopted the Wachtell
Bylaw in the months following its release).
416. ISS, Director Qualification/CompensationBylaw FAQs (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.issgovemance.
com/file/files/directorqualificationcompensationbylaws.pdf
417. Id.
418. See Cain et al., supranote 20, 653, 673 (discussing Provident Financial Holdings).
419. See id.at 653, 677 (reporting that all but four of the 32 companies that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw
retracted it after ISS's announcement); see Lipton, supranote 25 ("In light of ISS' threat that it may issue withhold
vote recommendations against boards that adopt director compensation bylaws, it can be expected that many
companies will decide that discretion is the better part of valor and avoid a confrontation with ISS, despite the
risks posed by 'golden leash' schemes.").
420. See, e.g., supra note 105 (describing how Jana used a golden leash to recruit a former Canadian Minister
of Agriculture to its dissident slate at Agrium).
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business, we accept that one needs to pay large sums to recruit top talent, 42 1 and that some
people are paid more than others, even with precisely the same title and position. 422 Hence
by preventing any golden leash payments whatsoever, the Wachtell Bylaw is probably
423
overly restrictive and thus not sufficiently narrowly tailored under Blasius-Buckley.
In this way, the Wachtell Bylaw is like the contribution limit struck down by the
Supreme Court in Randall v. Sorrel142 4 pursuant to the Buckley framework. Randall
concerned Vermont's campaign contribution limits, which placed very low caps ($200$400) on the amount that Vermonters could legally donate to candidates for state office.
The Supreme Court struck this down, with the lead opinion 425 holding these limits were so
426
low as to allow incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenges.
The Wachtell Bylaw suffers from the same weakness as the Vermont campaign finance
law. Both are well-intentioned and well-grounded, but they are simply too strict and thus
make it too difficult for a dissident to mount a successful challenge against the incumbents.
A golden leash payment of $1000 would not raise a reasonable fear of corruption; it looks
more like an honorarium than a bribe. By banning even very small golden leash payments,
the Wachtell Bylaw comes across as an incumbent entrenchment device, not a legitimate
4 27
effort to combat corruption.
At the same time, the dangers posed by the golden leash are real and substantial 428so strong medicine might be needed in a given instance. By analogy to the political arena,
to the extent that the golden leash is like a bribe, 4 29 such behavior is flatly banned in all
instances, regardless of the amount. A $1000 bribe can land you in jail just as easily as any
other.
Ultimately, the propriety of the Wachtell Bylaw depends on the facts. If a certain
company has well founded concerns that any sort of golden leash payment posed a threat
to its ability to pursue long-term profits, then the imposition of the Wachtell Bylaw may
well pass muster under Blasius-Buckley. Absent such a showing, however, a total ban
would probably not satisfy the demanding Blasius-Buckley framework. Something short of
a complete prohibition of the golden leash, however, may survive this demanding legal
4 30
test, and it is to such modified versions of the Wachtell Bylaw that we now turn.
421. Basketball star LeBron James recently signed a lifetime endorsement deal with Nike rumored to be
worth more than $500 million. Steven Russolillo, LeBron Deal Won'tFoulNike, WALL STREET J., Dec. 21,2015,
at C 1 ( "You have to spend money to make money ... ").
422. Kevin Durant (Oklahoma City Thunder) is paid about $20 million per year to play small forward in the
National Basketball Association; Greg Whittington (Miami Heat), Melvin Ejim (Orlando Magic) and Kyle Casey
(Phoenix Suns), by contrast, all receive about $500,000 per year to play the same position in the same league.
NBA PlayerSalaries-National Basketball Association, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nba/salaries (last visited Mar.
25, 2016).
423. Cf Gold, supranote 406 (arguing that the Wachtell Bylaw "may be legally invalid under Blasius").
424. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240 (2006).
425. See supra note 190 (describing Justice Breyer's plurality opinion in Randall as the controlling opinion
in the case).
426. Randall, 548 U.S. at 247.
427. But see supra note 414 (giving the caveat that the Wachtell Bylaw allows "customary" compensation,
and thus may allow golden leash payments of modest size).
428. See supra Section II.C (discussing the dangers of the golden leash).
429. Coffee, supra note 56.
430. The remainder of the bylaws considered in this Section are hypothetical. The only real-world bylaw on
point appears to be the Wachtell Bylaw.
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2. Modifications to the Wachtell Bylaw
a. Limit on Size of Golden Leash
An incumbent board of directors can alter the Wachtell Bylaw to make it more likely
to survive the Blasius-Buckley framework. One such modification would authorize golden
leash payments, but place some limits on its size, on the theory that a very large golden
leash payment is more likely to corrupt a director than one of more modest size. 4 3 1 There
are at least two different ways this could be implemented. The first would be to enact a
bylaw with an absolute dollar value, such as $1 million, as the highest golden leash
payment a director is allowed to accept.
The second would be to use a ratio based on the ordinary compensation the company
pays to its other directors. For example, a one-to-one ratio would provide that directors
may only receive as much in a golden leash as they do from the company. A two-to-one
ratio would allow a director to receive double the ordinary compensation as a golden leash
payment. A ratio might be more advisable, as it would allow the golden leash to act as a
recruiting and incentive tool, but prevent the side payment from swamping the ordinary
compensation paid to directors. By keeping the total compensation in the same magnitude,
this should not act as too much of an improper influence on directors.
Either way, and regardless of its precise contours, a board-enacted bylaw that imposed
reasonable limits on the size of a golden leash would probably qualify as narrowly tailored
under the Blasius-Buckley framework.
b. Limit on Type of Golden Leash
A second variation on the Wachtell Bylaw would regulate the type of golden leash
payments, for instance by requiring that any performance-based compensation be
calculated over a significant period of time. Recall that a primary criticism of the golden
leash is that it would lead directors to "maximize current [share price] at the expense of
long-term firm stability and performance." 4 32 For this reason a golden leash like the one at
General Motors, which called for a payment based on share performance over one year, is
4 33
of particular concern.
To address this danger, a board could adopt a bylaw that required any golden leash
payments to be based on share price performance over a reasonably long period of time
(e.g., five years), or require that recipients of a golden leash hold company stock for at least
that long. 434 Such a bylaw would stand a good chance of satisfying the Blasius-Buckley
framework because it directly addresses the concern over short-termism without being

431. See Nili, supra note 117, at 570 (recognizing that a very large golden leash could "reflect[] a form of
'loyalty-buying' by the activist").
432. Schloetzer, supra note 12, at 9; see also supra Section H.C (discussing the short-term incentives that
golden leashes may offer).
433. See Schloetzer, supra note 12, at 9 ("General Motors presents an example that could be used by
opponents of such compensation arrangements.").
434. See Nili, supra note 117, at 570 ("Activists could easily structure [a golden leash] in a manner that is
Pay could be further
more long-term oriented. For instance, such pay could be based on a five-year period ....
Five years is just an example; a board should
delayed and given at some point after the director's departure .. ").
use its judgment as to the proper timeframe.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 41:4

overbroad. In other words, such a bylaw would likely be found to be narrowly tailored.
c. Limits on Source of Golden Leash
Corporate boards could also enact a bylaw that imposes limits on the source of a
golden leash payment. One such limit could be that only shareholders may make golden
leash payments. This type of bylaw would respond directly to the concern of outside
influence (e.g., influence by non-shareholder constituencies). In this way it would be
analogous to the legal ban on corporate and union contributions to political campaigns.
Beyond simply limiting golden leash payers to shareholders, it may be good policy to
allow only large and long-standing shareholders to make golden leash payments. Those
types of shareholders are less likely to bring about the problematic aspects of the golden
leash because their large stake and long tenure provides comfort that their interests are
aligned with that of the corporation. How much should they have to hold, and for how
long? Recall that proxy access has generally been limited to shareholders holding 3% of
the stock for three years or more. 435 This model may be appropriate in the golden leash
context as well, where a bylaw would limit golden leash payments to those made by large
and longstanding shareholders. Of course, a board may conclude that a different
combination of size and holding period would be appropriate to ensure that the sponsor of
a golden leash is deeply committed to the long-term success of the corporation.
Alternatively, a bylaw could provide that after a golden leash is paid, its sponsor must
retain its investment for some period of time. A bylaw of that type would directly respond
to the concern that sponsors of golden leashes are only interested in success over the short
run by lashing them to the company for some significant period of time. A bylaw that
required sponsors to stay in the stock for a very long period of time, say twenty years,
would likely not be sufficiently narrowly tailored but rather would be so onerous as to
effectively quash the golden leash entirely. A shorter holding period of two or three years,
however, could probably qualify as narrowly tailored. This would depend on the facts of a
given case, including the strength of the corporate interest at stake, the risk of harm to the
company, and other considerations.
d. Disclosure
A final variation on the Wachtell Bylaw would be a bylaw that requires the disclosure
of the existence of golden leash payments as well as their details. As in the political context,
disclosure of who is financing a corporate campaign is so important, and such a minimal
hardship, that it could probably be required for all golden leashes. 436 This seems to be an

435. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75 (discussing proxy access practices at large public
companies).
436. See Schloetzer, supra note 12, at 6 ("[T]here is no specific requirement under the current US securities
rules for the disclosure of . . . compensation agreements between a [board] nominee and the nominating
shareholder ....
").
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437
and foes 4 38
uncontroversial proposition and indeed it has been embraced both by friends
of the golden leash. Thus a bylaw that only permitted golden leash payments whose details
were fully disclosed to the shareholders (and perhaps approved by them in a separate vote),
would almost certainly qualify as narrowly tailored under the Blasius-Buckley

framework.

439

VI. CONCLUSION
This Article claimed that the financing of corporate campaigns raises many of the
same issues as does the financing of political campaigns. Accordingly, when a board of
directors regulates the financing of dissident campaigns for directorships, corporate law
can and should look to the Supreme Court's Buckley framework for guidance. As a matter
of corporate law doctrine, the Blasius doctrine should incorporate a Buckley-like analysis
of board-imposed limits on corporate campaign finance. This Blasius-Buckley framework
would hold that the incumbent board is not protected by the business judgment rule but

rather must show a compelling corporate interest and that its action was narrowly tailored
to achieve that purpose. Applying this proposed rule to the golden leash-itself a form of
corporate campaign contribution-the Article explained that there are compelling
corporate interests at stake in regulating this type of director compensation, but that any
bylaws that restrict the golden leash must be narrowly tailored to pass muster.

437. See Nili, supra note 117, at 566 (recognizing that "a full and complete disclosure of [golden leash]
compensation agreements" is "extremely important"); ISS, Director Qualification/CompensationBylaw FA Qs
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.issgovemance.com/file/files/directorqualificationcompensationbylaws.pdf ("ISS has
not recommended voting against directors and boards at companies which have adopted bylaws precluding from
board service those director nominees who fail to disclose third-party compensatory payments. Such provisions
may provide greater transparency for shareholders, and allow for better-informed voting decisions.").
438. See Lipton, supranote 25 ("At a minimum, all companies should require full disclosure of any thirdparty arrangements that director candidates may have, which has long been a common practice .... ").
439. As this Article was going to press, the NASDAQ stock market proposed a new rule mandating
disclosure of golden leash payments at NASDAQ-listed companies. NASDAQ Form 19b-4, File No. SRNASDAQ-2016-013 (Jan. 28, 2016) (reporting the "proposal to require listed companies to publicly disclose
compensation or other payments by third parties to any nominee for director or sitting director in connection with
their candidacy for or service on the companies' Board of Directors"). While such a rule would not directly
implicate the Blasius-Buckley framework, since it is imposed by the exchange, rather than the board of directors,
supra text accompanying notes 294-97, NASDAQ's proposal lends support to the ideas expressed in this Article
that the golden leash can present a risk to important corporate interests, supra Sections II.C and V.A, and that
disclosure is a practical method of golden-leash regulation.

